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Editorial 
The COVID-19 pandemic represented yet another, in a series of many, shock to 
the global economy. Catching governments and policy officials by surprise, the 
pandemic very quickly exposed the weaknesses in national health and emergency 
response systems as well as in international political coordination. Countries and 
regions renowned for their healthcare provision, their quality of government and 
their level of development (including Lombardy, where the first European 
epicentre of the pandemic stroke) where soon engulfed into a healthcare crisis 
not seen in Europe at least since the end of WWII. The emergency measures that 
were put in place – in some places very swiftly, in others with significant, and often 
inexplicable, delays - naturally prioritised on the containment of the spread of the 
virus and the management of the capacity of the healthcare systems. Inevitably, 
the lockdowns that followed put a halt to most aspects of economic activity thus 
quickly translating a health crisis into an economic one. Almost invariably, 
governments across the globe put swiftly aside their ‘free-market economics’ and 
implemented measures seeking to stabilise and support the ailing economies – 
mainly in the form of wage subsidies (furloughing and short-working time 
schemes) but also through other means (income support, tax breaks and holidays, 
etc).  
Despite the global nature of the pandemic, responses in the first instance where 
astonishingly ‘national’, with little coordination across countries, even in cases 
where mechanisms and institutions of international coordination (such as the 
European Union) where in place. As a result, the pervasiveness and effectiveness 
of the various measures, both with regard to the pandemic itself and in relation to 
the economy, were very varied. Somewhat unusually, this variation did not square 
easily with obvious characteristics of the national political economies. Responses 
are difficult to group along the old fault-lines of “advanced” versus “less 
advanced” countries; they do not follow too well the Liberal versus Coordinated 
Market Economy of the Varieties of Capitalism literature or Esping-Andersen’s 
“worlds of welfare capitalism” or other traditional “north-south” distinctions; and 
– with the exception of small-sample tentative conclusions about the effectiveness
of measures in countries with female-led governments – they do not seem to link
to well also to distinctions regarding personal traits of national leaders. For
example1, Peru tops the global rankings in terms of number of COVID-related
deaths per million inhabitants, followed immediately by Belgium; Brazil is neck-
and-neck with the UK for the 8th place in the global ranking; Kosovo has done
almost twice as well as France but it is very comparable to Canada; while Austria
1 All information extracted from LSE’s Statista database on 25/9/2020 
(https://www.statista.com/statistics/1104709/coronavirus-deaths-worldwide-per-million-
inhabitants/)  
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and Turkey are very comparably 7 times less affected, on this count, than Sweden 
and Mexico.  
In all this context of crisis and instability, Greece has emerged as a surprisingly 
good case – giving a new meaning to the old political scientist’s term “Greek 
exceptionalism”. With 313 confirmed deaths and a total of approximately 3,600 
cases, Greece stands in the 86th position in the global deaths-per-capita rankings, 
with less than 30 COVID-related deaths per million of population. The containment 
of the virus by the Greek authorities and the health-related and economic policy 
responses of the country have been hailed in international media (e.g., The 
Guardian, New York Times, and others) as a great success. Battered by its very own 
and extremely prolongated financial, fiscal, political and economic crisis and the 
three adjustment programmes of 2010-2018, and given its openness (tourism) and 
known weaknesses with regard to surveillance, compliance and enforcement, the 
country could have been a very easy target for the deadly virus. Instead, and 
despite the recent upward trend, the spread of the virus has been largely 
contained; the support measures taken in the economy have been received by 
many – including many international commentators – as robust and effective; and 
the impact on the economic has been much less severe than one could initially 
anticipate.  
How did this happen? And is Greece, then, a success story? And are the policies 
that have been put in place, for the labour market and the economy at large, 
sufficient, or sufficiently effective to deal with the implications of the pandemic in 
the medium- to long-run? What are the lessons that we can learn from the Greek 
response to the crisis? And how the crisis – and the support measures – affected 
patterns of work and work-life balance in the country?  
There are hundreds – perhaps thousands – of relevant and intriguing question one 
could ask within this context. Questions about the economics of the crisis, the 
politics of the crisis, the politics of international coordination with regard to the 
crisis, the geopolitics of Greece, the functioning of the party system and the 
effectiveness of public administration, the societal responses to the crisis and the 
cultural and other traits that these reflect, the distributional implications of the 
crisis and the political economy and economic geography of the spread of the 
virus, the robustness of the health service in Greece, and many-many more. 
Engaging in analytical ways with these questions will take time – time and a lot of 
effort – as the pandemic is, unfortunately, a bit too fast-moving and thus difficult 
to ‘test’ or examine systematically in a short period of time. Still, a small literature 
has emerged – quite fast, given the circumstances – that has started this enquiry.  
This special edition of GreeSE Papers is a small effort to contribute in this direction. 
It hosts three papers on the economic impact of COVID-19 in Greece and the policy 
responses and adjustments in the Greek labour market. The first, by G. 
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Economides and A. Philippopoulos, utilises a computable general equilibrium 
macroeconomic model of the Greek economy, partly developed as part of a 
project funded by the Hellenic Observatory, to examine the possible impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on the Greek economy under different policy scenarios. With 
this, it highlights the costs and wider economic implications of various policy 
options for the management of the pandemic in the country, thus contributing 
directly to informing policy on the steps that are to be followed as the crisis 
evolves. The second, by Betcherman et al – including former HO Research Officer 
Ioannis Laliotis – offers an in-depth study of the the short-term impacts of the 
COVID-19 lockdown on the Greek labour market. The paper has already attracted 
significant attention in policy circles and the public domain and has also been 
hosted in prestigious discussion papers series, including the Institute of Labor in 
Bonn (IZA) and the World Bank. The paper presents robust evidence showing that 
the emergency job-protection measures that were put in place were effective in 
maintaining employee retention and reducing job separations; but where not 
sufficient to counter the dramatic slowdown in hiring that, as it happened, took 
place at a time “when job creation typically peaks in normal years, mostly in 
tourism”. The third paper, by K. Pouliakias, turns its attention to aspects of work 
organisation, examining how the COVID-19 pandemic and the social distancing 
and work-from-home measures that were put in place may have contributed to 
the “unexplored potential” of teleworking – an area where the country has been 
a notable laggard in the European Union context.  
As noted already, this small collection of papers cannot possibly cover in any shape 
or form the breadth of issues that emerge in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
its economic impacts and the policy challenges – and social costs – that these raise. 
This notwithstanding, they represent in many ways the state of the art of Greek 
research on the issue, by some of the most promising scholars in the country in 
their respective fields and the contribute – each to its limited extent – to the 
debate that needs to take place about the management of the COVID-19 crisis and 
the future steps that policy – as well as society and its economic agents – should 
take in dealing with the multifaceted consequences of the crisis, as the crisis 
unfolds and evolves. We hope that you will find the material presented in this 
special edition useful and we invite you to continue monitoring the pages of 
GreeSE Papers for future publications on the topic.  
 
Vassilis Monastiriotis, 
Editor-in-Chief, GreeSE Papers   
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1. Introduction and main findings 
 
In the beginning of 2020, the world was stricken by the covid-19 pandemic which, 
at the time of this writing, is expected to cause a severe economic downturn 
worldwide. A public financing crisis is also expected to follow as most governments 
have stepped in and new "unprecedented" fiscal and monetary policies have been 
adopted or promised to be adopted. Greece is not an exception. Actually, the 
pandemic struck the Greek economy just when it embarked on a moderate growth 
path after years of economic depression associated with its sovereign debt crisis. 
To make matters worse, the pandemic has found Greece with limited fiscal space 
(its public debt was already around 175% of GDP in the end of 2019). 
This raises two interrelated questions: First, what will be the size and the duration 
of the new economic downturn? Second, what are the right policy reactions to 
this downturn? As is widely recognized (see e.g. European Commission (2020a)), 
although the shock is symmetric hurting most countries, its effects will be uneven 
depending, except from the severity of the pandemic and the stringency of the 
containment measures in each country, on how the shock propagates to each 
economy, the initial conditions and the way each country responds to the 
economic downturn. 
In this short paper, using the macroeconomic model for Greece constructed by 
Economides et al. (2020), and the lessons learnt from the sovereign debt crisis in 
2008-2016, we will try to give quantitative answers to the above questions. In 
particular, in Economides et al. (2020), we have constructed a medium-scale 
macroeconomic model that embeds the main features of the Greek economy in 
the euro period. To this model, we add a temporary adverse labour supply shock 
so as to get the drop in economic activity caused by the pandemic; this is as in 
Eichenbaum et al. (2020) and can mimic the effects of the necessitated 
containment measures on labour supply. 
Our quantitative results are as follows. Departing from the year 2019, and 
assuming a rather moderate value for the adverse labour supply shock that lasts 
during 2020 only, our simulations show that in 2020, and in the fictional case of 
no policy reaction, the Greek economy could suffer an output loss of around 12% 
relative to 2019 and public debt to GDP could jump to more than 220%. This shows 
the big vulnerability of the Greek economy to supply shocks even of relatively 
small magnitude. Policy responses, on the other hand, can mitigate the economic 
damage. For example, responding with higher public spending and lower taxes, as 
the Greek government has already done or has announced to do, can make the 
recession milder (the output loss can be around 8.5% in 2020) and the rise in the 
public debt to GDP smaller (it could be around 214%). The same simulations show 
that the expected financial assistance from the EU, via the balance sheet policies 
of the ECB and the official fiscal aid from the newly established Recovery Fund (the 
latter is around 32 billion euros for Greece), can seriously help the Greek economy 
 9 
but this depends crucially on the way it is used. If it is used, for example, to finance 
public investment, it will limit the output loss to around 6.5% in 2020 and will also 
put the country on a sustainable path with public debt falling to around 168.5% in 
the coming years thanks to economic growth. If, on the other hand, this financial 
assistance becomes a common pool for rent seeking4, it will be completely wasted 
(the GDP will be as if the country has received zero aid from the EU) and the 
country will be trapped in a bad equilibrium in the coming years. Product market 
liberalization and improvements in institutional quality will also be crucial, as they 
have been during the sovereign debt crisis in the 2010s. 
Therefore, similarly to the sovereign debt crisis in the previous decade, a different 
spending-tax policy mix, product market liberalization, an improvement in 
institutional quality, and a socially productive use of the redistributive resources 
made available from the EU, can help the Greek economy, not only to overcome 
the pandemic with the minimum possible output losses in 2020, but also to 
achieve higher medium-term economic growth and a lower public debt-to-GDP 
ratio over time. Reversing the argument, if we repeat the same mistakes made 
during the sovereign debt crisis (anti-growth policy mix combined with a sharp 
deterioration in institutional quality), Greece will enter a new phase of deep 
economic depression. 
The rest of this note is as follows. Section 2 explains how we work and introduces 
the alternative policy scenaria assumed. Quantitative results, borrowed from our 
main work in Economides et al. (2020), are presented in section 3. Section 4 closes 
the note. 
 
 
2. How we work and policy scenario 
 
We work as follows. First, employing the model constructed by Economides et al. 
(2020), we get a stationary solution using data of the year 2019. This solution 
serves as a departure point for our new numerical simulations. Second, departing 
 
4A prerequisite of rent seeking is an institutional failure in the form of poorly defined and 
protected property rights (see e.g. Drazen (2000, chapter 10)). It is this failure that allows 
private and/or public assets and income to become common pools or contestable prizes, 
which, in turn, incentivise self-interested agents (with the right connections) to participate 
in rent seeking competition. All this implies a misallocation of resources so that the society 
incurs productivity and welfare losses. For modelling details, see Economides et al. (2020). 
For the key importance of property rights among other measures of institutional quality, see 
e.g. Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu (2009, chapters 4 and 22), Besley and Persson (2009), 
Besley and Ghatak (2010) and many others. For quantitative macro models with such 
problems, see e.g. Angelopoulos et al. (2009), Economides et al. (2020) and Christou et al. 
(2020). For data on institutional quality in Greece relative to other countries, see e.g. Masuch 
et al. (2018) and Christou et al. (2020); Greece scores very poorly in almost all indices. 
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from this solution, we add a labor supply shock, denoted as Φt, as in Eichenbaum 
et al. (2020), keeping all other driving forces (exogenous and policy variables) at 
their 2019 values. We start by setting Φt at 0.8 during 2020 and at 1 from 2021 
onwards (meaning that in 2021 we go back to the Greek normality). We label this 
to be our baseline bad scenario regarding the impact of covid-19 without any 
government policy reaction. Third, we study various policy reactions to this 
situation. In doing so, we distinguish policy reactions without, and with, financial 
aid from the EU. 
Fictional scenaria without help from the EU We focus on the following cases: (I) 
The government, during 2020, makes a transfer to all households, and not only to 
public employees (the labour income of public employees is assumed to remain 
unaffected by the shock even in the baseline bad scenario, as it has been the case 
in practice). This transfer covers the reduction in all labour incomes caused by the 
pandemic shock. (II) On top of (I), during 2020 and 2021, the government also 
increases temporarily by 1 percentage point all other public spending items as 
shares to GDP. (III) On top of (I)-(II), from 2020 onwards, the government also 
reduces permanently the effective income and consumption tax rates, each by 
one percentage point, and this extra loss in public revenue is somehow balanced 
by cuts in government transfers by the same percentage point from 2021 
onwards. We believe that, among the above mentioned scenaria, the possible 
quantitative impact of COVID-19 on the Greek economy can be better captured by 
scenario (III), since the Greek government has already adopted, or has promised 
to adopt, a set of policy measures which include, among others, transfers to 
households and firms, increases in public spending in general and tax reductions 
or discounts. Scenaria (I) and (II) however help us to understand the effect of one 
policy measure at a time. Scenaria with help from the EU In addition to the above 
responses, we study the impact of the establishment of the new fund, the so-
called European Recovery Fund, whose aim will be to raise money from private 
markets and then allocate it to member-countries depending on how much they 
have been hurt by the covid-19 pandemic (see European Commission (2020b)). 
According to the information available so far, Greece could benefit up to a net 
amount of 32 billion euros mainly in the form of grants. This amount translates 
into around 17% of the Greek GDP in 2019, and should be used by the end of 2024. 
Therefore, in an attempt to quantify the effects of this new financial assistance 
from the EU, in addition to scenaria (I)-(III), which had to do with policy reactions 
at national level, we will also investigate the following three scenaria all of which 
incorporate this EU assistance to our model5: In scenario (IV), on top of the policy 
measures included in scenario (III), which can serve as the policy benchmark, we 
assume that the Greek government uses the 32 extra billion euros from the EU to 
 
5 In terms of modelling, we just have to add the assumed amount of financial assistance, or 
foreign aid, to the budget constraint of the government and of course to the balance of 
payments. 
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finance public investment over the years 2021-2014 (we assume that one fourth 
of the total amount is used for this purpose each year). This can give us an idea of 
the potential benefits from the EU support when the country makes a "good" use 
of the money received. In scenario (V), on top of (IV), we assume that the country 
also implements stronger - and at a faster pace - reforms in the product market so 
as the degree of competition in the Greek product market approaches the one in 
the core eurozone countries within three years. This attempts to capture the 
contribution of structural reforms to economic recovery. Finally, in scenario (VI), 
we go to the other extreme from (IV) and (V). Now, instead of assuming that 
Greece uses the amount of 32 billion euros to finance public investment, we 
assume that this amount is misused in the sense that it becomes a contestable 
prize and that atomistic economic agents compete with each other for a share of 
this contestable prize. We do so because there is a lot of anecdotal, as well as 
econometric, evidence that, in countries with weak institutions, like Greece, 
foreign aid transfers increase the size of the prize that interest groups fight over 
and hence induce rent seeking activities (see e.g. Economides et al. (2008)). In 
turn, rent seeking in the recipient country, and the distortion of incentives 
triggered by this type of anti-social competition, mitigate the beneficial effects 
that foreign aid may have in the first place. Our model of Tullock-type rent seeking 
competition (see Economides et al. (2020) for details) can easily accommodate 
this possibility; we just add the amount of 32 billion euros (one fourth of it in each 
year from 2021 to 2024) to the existing contestable prize. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
Departing from 2019, Graph 1 illustrates the simulated path of GDP when the 
economy is hit by the covid-19 shock in 2020 as defined above and if there is no 
policy reaction at all. In the so-called bad scenario, as said above, Φt takes the 
value of 0.8 in 2020 and then returns to 1 for ever. In this graph, we also study a 
worse scenario in which Φt takes the value of 0.75 in 2020, which can be thought 
of as the case in which there is a second wave of the pandemic which might require 
a new lockdown of households/firms (however, even in this worse scenario, Φt is 
assumed to return to 1 in 2021 and to remain there for ever). As can be seen in 
Graph 1, in the bad scenario, the economy loses almost 12% of its output relatively 
to 2019, whereas, in the worse scenario, this loss exceeds 15%. To make it worse, 
the economy does not manage to rebound in the years after in the sense that GDP 
remains below its 2019 level. These results show the big vulnerability of the Greek 
economy to supply shocks even of relatively small magnitude. They also imply that 
government intervention has been more than necessary. 
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Graph 1: The economic impact of covid-19 without any response 
 
 
 
Graph 2 presents the simulated paths of public debt to GDP under the bad and the 
worse scenaria. In the bad scenario, the public debt to GDP ratio in 2020 exceeds 
225%, whereas, in the worse scenario, it jumps to 247%, both due to the snowball 
effect. However, as said, all this is without policy reaction, which once 
implemented, is expected to limit the economic downturn and the rise in public 
debt. We now turn to policy reactions. 
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Graph 2: The public debt to GDP ratio without any response 
 
 
 
In Graph 3, we investigate whether the various policy measures and/or reforms, 
defined as scenaria (I), (II) and (III) above, can mitigate the economic damage from 
COVID-19. In particular, compensating all income groups for the labour income 
losses they have suffered (this is scenario I) results in an output loss of about 11% 
in 2020, whereas, in 2021, the output is expected to grow at a rate of about 9.9%. 
However, the economy cannot make up for its output losses in the years after. If, 
on top of compensating all income groups for their labour income losses, the 
government also increases temporarily (for the years 2020 and 2021) all other 
government spending items by 1 percentage point (this is scenario II), the 
recession in 2020 gets milder amounting to a drop of about 8.8% instead of 11% 
which was the case under scenario I. On the other hand, again, although the 
economy is expected to grow at a rate of about 8.7% in 2021, its GDP cannot 
return to its 2019 level in the coming years. Putting these results together, 
reacting with public spending instruments only can produce an incomplete and 
gradual (U-shaped) recovery only. If, however, increases in government spending 
are accompanied by permanent decreases of 1 percentage point in effective 
income and consumption tax rates, which are financed by equal cuts in 
government transfers from 2021 onwards (this is scenario III), then aggregate 
things get relatively better. In this case, the GDP loss in 2020 is limited to 8.6% and 
the economy is expected to grow at a rate of about 9.4% in 2021 restoring fully, 
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even in absolute terms, its output capacity. Thus, the tax-spending mix will be 
crucial to the recovery, as it was the case during the previous, debt crisis. 
 
 
Graph 3: The economic impact of covid-19 under scenaria (I), (II) and (III) 
 
 
 
Graph 4 presents the simulated paths of public debt to GDP under scenaria (I), (II) 
and (III). For example, the adoption of policy measures, such as the ones described 
in scenario (III), can limit the increase of public debt to GDP ratio to about 213.7%, 
relative to about 225% in the bad scenario discussed above, despite the increased 
fiscal cost associated with the expansionary government measures; this is thanks 
to the lower output loss that this scenario implies. In all cases, however, the public 
debt to output ratio de-escalates after the impact year as the economy rebounds, 
although at different paces depending on the scenario assumed. 
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Graph 4: The public debt to GDP ratio under scenaria (I), (II) and (III) 
 
 
 
Next, Graph 5 presents the simulated paths of output under scenario (IV), (V) and 
(VI) as defined above. In particular, under scenario (IV), the output loss in 2020 is 
limited to about 6.5%; recall that, according to this scenario, the Greek 
government has at its disposal extra 32 billion euros from the EU all of which are 
assumed to be used to finance public investment plans allocated equally over the 
years 2021-2024. Moreover, in this scenario, in all years after 2020, the GDP is well 
above its pre-crisis 2019 level. In turn, if the spending and tax policy measures, 
included in scenario (IV), are complemented by the implementation of stronger 
product market reforms so as the associated degree of competition approaches 
that in the core eurozone countries (this is scenario V), the output loss is limited 
to 5.6% in 2020. and the economy enjoys even stronger growth in the years after. 
Finally, the black line in Graph 5, illustrates the path of GDP under scenario (VI) 
which is the "misuse" scenario. Now, as defined above, the 32 billion package plays 
the role of a common pool attacked by rent seekers. This scenario, in addition to 
a huge waste of resources, condemns the country to economic stagnation and, in 
terms of GDP, it is as if the country has received no international aid (the time path 
of GDP under VI coincides with that under III). 
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Graph 5: The economic impact of covid-19 under scenaria (IV), (V) and (VI) 
 
 
 
Finally, Graph 6 presents the simulated paths of public debt to GDP under scenaria 
(IV), (V) and (VI). In scenario (IV), the public debt to GDP ratio in 2020 approaches 
207%, whereas, in scenario (V), the same ratio reaches 204%. In 2024, the public 
debt to output ratio falls to 168.5% under (IV) and 166.6% under (V) respectively. 
In other words, economic growth helps the country to grow out its public debt. By 
contrast, under the misuse scenario (VI), public debt jumps to 212.3% and remains 
high in the coming years. 
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Graph 6: The public debt to GDP ration under scenaria (IV), (V) and (VI) 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In this short paper, we tried to identify the quantitative impact of the covid-19 
pandemic crisis on the Greek macroeconomy under different policy scenaria. Our 
analysis was not limited only to the possible effects on growth for 2020, but also 
tried to capture the growth perspectives for the period after the pandemic. 
Our main message is that for the Greek economy to enter an era of sustainable 
economic growth capable of not only mitigating but also overcoming the adverse 
consequences of the covid-19 crisis in the near future, a mix of coherent and 
consistent policies is needed that combines: (i) a growth-enhancing tax-spending 
fiscal policy mix (ii) further product market liberalization (iii) a substantial 
improvement in institutional quality and (iv) a socially productive use of the 
redistributive resources that have been made available by the EU. Otherwise, with 
high probability, the Greek economy is in danger of being trapped in new long-
lasting depression similar to that experienced during the sovereign debt crisis of 
the previous decade. 
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ABSTRACT  
We use administrative, survey, and online vacancy data to analyze the short-term 
labor market impacts of the COVID-19 lockdown in Greece. We find that flows into 
unemployment have not increased; in fact, separations were lower than would 
have been expected given trends in recent years. At the same time, employment 
was about 12 percent lower at the end of June than it would have been without 
the pandemic. Our interrupted time series and difference-in-differences estimates 
indicate that this was due to a dramatic slowdown in hiring during months when 
job creation typically peaks in normal years, mostly in tourism. While we do not 
formally test the reasons for these patterns, our analysis suggests that the 
measures introduced to mitigate the effects of the crisis in Greece have played an 
important role. These measures prohibited layoffs in industries affected by the 
crisis and tied the major form of income support to the maintenance of 
employment relationships. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has had dramatic consequences for economies and labor 
markets around the world. The pandemic has been unique in triggering both 
supply and demand shocks. To contain the spread of the virus, governments 
introduced various confinement and lockdown measures that shut down 
businesses and removed workers from their jobs. At the same time, there have 
been substantial declines in demand despite large government transfers to firms, 
workers, and households in many countries. According to the World Bank’s June 
forecast, global GDP is expected to fall by 5% in 2020, with the decrease projected 
at 7% in the advanced economies (World Bank, 2020). The ILO estimates that the 
decrease in labor demand in the second quarter of 2020 compared to the last 
quarter of 2019 will be equivalent to the loss of about 400 million jobs worldwide 
(ILO, 2020c). The OECD expects that overall unemployment in member countries 
will be in double digits for the remainder of 2020, more than twice the 5.3% 
unemployment rate in the first quarter of the year (OECD, 2020).  
 
While a dramatic reduction in labor demand has been a consequence of the 
pandemic everywhere, there has been considerable variation in how different 
labor markets have adjusted to the shock. Take the examples of two G-7 countries 
that have been hard-hit by the virus. In the United States, the unemployment rate 
more than tripled between February and May, with 14 million workers added to 
the unemployment rolls in this period. Italy, on the other hand, experienced a 
decline in unemployment, with almost 400,000 fewer unemployed workers in May 
compared to February. There, the adjustment to declining labor demand has 
occurred through labor force withdrawal. There are also important differences 
emerging between countries in terms of the types of jobs and workers most 
affected by the crisis. 
 
In this paper, we analyze how the labor market in Greece has been affected during 
the early months of the pandemic and lockdown. Greece is a particularly 
interesting case, both because of its situation prior to the arrival of COVID-19 and 
because of how the pandemic has been handled. Greece entered the current crisis 
just as it seemed to be finally emerging from the protracted and deep recession 
the country had endured since the financial crisis began more than a decade 
earlier. After declining every year from 2008 to 2013, Greece’s real GDP has 
experienced modest growth since 2014, with an annual increase of about 2% in 
2018 and 2019.  At the same time, labor market conditions, while still difficult, 
were improving. After peaking at over 27% in 2013, the unemployment rate had 
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slowly but consistently declined to 14.3% in March of this year, the lowest monthly 
rate in a decade. 
 
To this point, Greece has been quite successful in holding the pandemic in check.  
While many neighboring countries suffered rapid escalations in cases and deaths, 
and severe burdens on health care systems, for the most part Greece has been 
able to avoid difficulties of such magnitude. As of mid-July, Greece had fewer than 
4,000 confirmed cases which, on a per capita basis, is roughly one-twentieth of 
the rate in Spain and one-tenth of Italy’s rate.  Less than 200 deaths have been 
attributed to the virus, about one-thirtieth of the rate in Italy and Spain. These 
numbers reflect a swift response of the Government after the first case was 
confirmed on February 26. After that, and within a relatively narrow time window, 
closures shut down public events, schools, workplaces, travel, and public 
gatherings, and finally a general stay-at-home order was implemented on March 
23 (eventually lifted on May 4). The Government was also very active in 
introducing a series of measures to help employers and workers weather the 
economic consequences of the lockdown. These included various forms of tax and 
rent relief for businesses, unemployment benefit extensions, financial support and 
social insurance coverage for employees whose contracts have been suspended, 
financial support for the self-employed, and prohibitions on dismissals for 
businesses shut down by state order.  
 
Nonetheless, as elsewhere, the pandemic and lockdown are having major 
economic impacts in Greece. The Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) reports 
that on a seasonally adjusted basis, GDP declined by 1.6% in the first quarter 
compared to the fourth quarter of 2019.12 In its Summer Forecast, the European 
Commission predicts that economic activity will decrease by 9% in 2020.13 In this 
situation, a significant deterioration in labor market conditions would be 
expected. 
 
The main empirical contribution we make in this paper is to describe in some detail 
how the Greek labor market has evolved in the first few months of the pandemic. 
Relying on a range of sources including administrative data, survey data, and data 
from online job posting sites, we document the drop in employment following the 
imposition of the lockdown and the subsequent flat employment trend through 
the first months that followed. Two things are particularly noteworthy about the 
patterns we have observed. First, while Greece did not experience the major 
 
12 The relevant ELSTAT press release can be found here. 
13 The Summer 2020 Interim forecast is here. 
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declines in employment that some other OECD countries did in March, April, and 
May, these are normally months when employment growth is substantial in the 
heavily seasonal Greek economy. Second, employment in these months in 2020 
differed from the story in previous years not because the lockdown fueled large 
numbers of separations but rather it choked off new hiring in what should have 
been expansionary months. In fact, compared to recent years, separations were 
comparable or even lower. We attribute this largely to the regulations and wage 
subsidies introduced by the Government that were designed to minimize job loss.  
 
Indeed, one of the messages from our analysis is that policy choices help to explain 
how the labor market has responded differently to the pandemic shock in 
different OECD countries. A particularly relevant distinction is between countries, 
like Greece, that have primarily linked their support to the maintenance of the 
employment relationship through dismissal restrictions, wage subsidies, and 
short-term compensation and those countries that have largely let layoffs occur 
and supported workers through unemployment benefits and cash transfers. 
Highlighting this link between policy choices and labor market outcomes is a 
second contribution of this paper. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized into the following sections. In section 2, 
we review the early evidence on how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected labor 
markets in OECD countries. We note how a roughly similar shock has translated 
into different outcomes across countries and highlight the role of government 
mitigation policies in shaping those outcomes. Section 3 turns to the pandemic in 
Greece. It describes the measures introduced by the Government to control the 
spread and to compensate firms and workers, and it uses mobility data to 
document the evolution of the lockdown. In section 4, we describe the different 
data sources and methods used for our labor market analysis. That analysis is 
presented in section 5. It tracks employment and unemployment trends during 
the lockdown, with an emphasis on how the overall picture has been shaped by 
the dynamics of hirings and separations. Finally, in section 6, conclusions are 
presented as well as some key research questions moving forward to understand 
the impact of the pandemic on the Greek labor market. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Challenges related to data and measurement  
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected entire economies and labor markets at a 
very fast pace, requiring policy makers to have access to up-to-date information 
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to design suitable and timely policy responses. However, the disruptions caused 
by the pandemic and the speed with which the crisis has unfolded have shown 
that the methods and sources normally used to track labor market outcomes may 
have significant shortcomings in this context.  For example, even gold standard 
surveys designed to provide up-to-date information, such as the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) in the United States, may not be sufficient to keep up with 
the fast spread of the virus and its disruptive impacts. Administrative data released 
with shorter time lags, as in the case of UI claims in the United States14, have also 
shown to have shortcomings that limit their effectiveness in timely and 
comprehensively informing policy responses during the pandemic (Cajner et al, 
2020).   
 
Furthermore, social distancing and other transmission prevention measures have 
affected several data-related activities around the world with potential impacts 
on data quality and reliability.  ILO (2020b) shows that data collection, supervision, 
cleaning and analysis have been affected in several countries. Adjustments in 
survey instruments, data collection methods and weighting schemes have become 
necessary to address issues related to low response rates and non-random 
patterns in non-responses. Even with these adjustments, response rates have 
dropped in several cases. The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics documents 
that the response rate for the 2020 May Establishment Survey was 69%, compared 
to a 75% average between March 2019 and February 2020. The corresponding 
figure for the household survey in May 2020 was 67%, compared to the 82% 
average over the twelve months ending in February 2020 (BLS, 2020). 
Furthermore, focusing on the nature on non-responses in the March and April 
2020 rounds of the CPS, Montenovo et al. (2020) show that the drops in responses 
in these two months were not random.      
 
The specific disruptions emerging from the crisis have also implied that standard 
labor market definitions may not be sufficient to fully capture labor market 
dynamics under the pandemic. For example, given the different forms of mobility 
restrictions and social distancing measures currently in place, variations in 
unemployment may be misleading. In fact, in the COVID-19 era, slow increases in 
unemployment may co-exist with significant job losses. This is because non-
employed people, despite being interested in working, might not be actively 
looking for a job as a result of restrictions on economic activities or the perceived 
risk of contracting the disease at work. As such, going beyond the analysis of 
employment, unemployment and labor force participation trends, becomes 
 
14 Official estimates on UI claims are released 12 days after the end of the week they refer to. 
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important to fully understand labor market dynamics during the crisis (ILO, 2020b; 
Abraham, 2020; Hamermesh, 2020).   
 
Several efforts have been made over the last months to address these challenges. 
Some researchers have complemented administrative and survey data with online 
vacancy data that record information in real-time and are available with short time 
lags (Kahn et al, 2020; Campello et al., 2020; Hensvick et al.; 2020).  Kong and Prinz 
(2020) and Goldsmith-Pinkham and Sojourner (2020) use google search data to 
predict UI claims in the US with the objective to reduce the time lag with which 
this information becomes available. Other authors have leveraged on private 
sector data, specifically payroll data (Cajner et al., 2020), data from a time and 
scheduling software (Kurman et al., 2020) or data from daily purchases (Coibion 
et al., 2020). By combining these data with information from traditional data 
sources or augmenting these data with newly collected COVID-related 
information, they have been able to provide timely and detailed insights on the 
labor market impacts of the crisis.  
 
Several other researchers have used newly collected data based on surveys 
specifically implemented to better understand the impacts of the crisis. In the 
United States, Bick and Blandin (2020) fielded a survey that follows a similar 
structure to the CPS but that generates more timely estimates. Brynjolfsson et al. 
(2020) used Google Consumer Surveys to collect two waves of survey data in April 
and May 2020. Bartik et al. (2020) focused on firms and collected data from 
approximately 5,800 businesses using an online survey. Online surveys were also 
used in the UK (Gardiner and Slaughter, 2020) and in Belgium (Baert at al. 2020) 
to collect data from workers, and in Denmark (Bennedsen et al., 2020) to collect 
data from firms. Finally, some researchers implemented multi-country online 
surveys. Adams-Prassl et al. (2020) covered Germany, the United States and the 
UK, while Belot et al. focused on China, Japan, Korea, the United States, UK, and 
Italy.      
 
2.2 Evidence on employment impacts and the role of policies 
Combining data from surveys, administrative and real-time sources, the ILO 
estimates large drops in employment due to the pandemic. To address the data 
and methodological challenges emerging from the crisis, the ILO developed what 
they refer to as a “nowcasting” model, which provides real time statistical 
prediction based on a multiplicity of traditional and non-traditional data sources 
(ILOa, 2020). Based on this model, the ILO estimates that between April and June 
2020, Europe alone experienced a decline in hours worked equivalent to 37 million 
full-time jobs compared to the last quarter of 2019. Projections for the second half 
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of 2020 show that even in the most optimistic scenario, hours worked would still 
be far from pre-COVID levels. The OECD projects unemployment in OECD 
countries to be at 11.5% in mid-2020, twice the level at the end of 2019. The 
projections for the rest of the year still show unemployment rates well above the 
pre-outbreak levels, with the most optimistic scenario suggesting levels 
comparable those recorded during the peak of the Global Financial Crisis (OECD, 
2020).  
 
These significant drops in hours worked are the result of different labor market 
adjustments in various countries.  ILO (2020c) shows that working hour losses 
were not due to significant job losses in the UK and in Korea, as the vast majority 
of workers were still able to keep their jobs even if working fewer or no hours.  As 
a result of this, unemployment was not greatly affected in these countries. The 
implications of reductions in hours worked were significantly different in Canada 
and the US. In Canada, almost half of the reduction in hours worked was due to 
people losing their jobs. In the United States, two-thirds of the decline in hours 
worked was due to people losing their jobs. Among those who lost their jobs, 
relatively more people became inactive in Canada, while the majority became 
unemployed in the United States. Furthermore, these disruptions did not equally 
affect all workers and segments of the economy. Estimates suggest that women, 
migrants, young people, informal workers, and specific vulnerable sectors and 
occupations were particularly hit by the crisis (ILOa, 2020; OECD, 2020). 
 
The policies introduced to attenuate the disruptions caused by the pandemic have 
likely played a role in the way labor markets have responded in different countries. 
Gentilini et al. (2020) show that since the beginning of the outbreak, 200 countries 
implemented more than 1,000 social protection and employment measures to 
address the impacts of the crisis. While most of these interventions were cash 
transfer programs, several countries also introduced policies specifically focused 
on attenuating the labor market impacts of the crisis: 64 countries provided 
unemployment benefits, 53 social security subsidies, 69 wage subsidies, 24 labor 
market regulation adjustments and 10 shorter work time benefits.  
 
Some clear patterns have emerged after these initial months of policies’ 
implementation. A first group of countries has focused on policies and programs 
aimed at preserving existing employment relationships, often implemented 
through the provision of subsidies to reduce labor and other costs for employers 
and/or the introduction of measures to limit dismissals. New Zealand, Germany, 
Denmark, France, and Switzerland are all countries in which take-up rates in job 
retention schemes have been high. A second group of countries has focused on 
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mitigating the impacts of the crisis on workers by expanding unemployment 
insurance systems.  In the United States, Israel, Norway, Canada and Ireland, the 
unemployment insurance system has played an important role in response to the 
crisis. While projections, administrative data and surveys suggest that increases in 
unemployment have been minimal for the first group of countries, unemployment 
has increased significantly for the second group (Rothwell, 2020; OECD, 2020).      
 
A large body of research in the last months has focused on better understanding 
the impacts of COVID on labor markets in specific countries, with a particular 
attention to identifying groups severely affected by the crisis and jobs at risk. An 
increasing number of papers has also focused on the impacts of the pandemic on 
small firms, on the role of policies in shaping labor market dynamics, and on 
potential shock-induced changes in labor market behaviors such as job search.  
 
Studies focused on the United States suggest that significant job losses were 
recorded in March and April, with some initial signs of recovery in May, which 
however seem to have slowed down by the end of June. Evidence from both 
standard surveys (Béland et al., 2020a; Cowan, 2020) and private sector data 
(Coibion et al., 2020; Cajner et al. 2020) point to unprecedented drops in 
employment, increases in unemployment and declines in labor force participation. 
Between February and April 2020, it was estimated that at least 20 million people 
lost their jobs (Coibion et al., 2020; Cajner et al. 2020). These patterns have been 
accompanied by significant declines in job vacancies posted by firms (Kahn et al., 
2020; Campello et al., 2020). Estimates based on real-time population surveys 
document strong increases in employment and declines in unemployment during 
May and most of June. However, the current figures are still well below their pre-
COVID levels (Bick and Blanding, 2020).   
 
These findings are confirmed by studies focused on small businesses. Kurman et 
al. (2020) find that until mid-April employment in small businesses in the services 
sector dropped by 60%, equivalent to the loss of 18.2 million jobs. However, from 
mid-April to June more than half of the closed businesses reopened, resulting in 
9.1 million additional jobs, mainly taken by previously furloughed workers. Bartik 
et. al (2020) find similar patterns and point to significant heterogeneity across 
sectors, with retail, arts and entertainment, personal services, food services, 
hospitality reporting the largest declines. Using CPS data, Fairlie (2020) confirms 
that economic activities by small business significantly declined in April and only 
partially recovered in May.  
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Overall, the research so far seems to unanimously show that the workers hit the 
hardest by the crisis are women, young,  low-educated (Béland et al., 2020a; Bick 
and Blanding, 2020; Cho and Winters, 2020; Cowan, 2020; Montenovo et al., 2020) 
or with an ethnic minority or migration background (Béland et al., 2020a; Borjas 
and Cassidy, 2020; Cho and Winters, 2020; Cowan, 2020; Fairlie et al., 2020; 
Montenovo et al., 2020). Nevertheless, some evidence suggests that during the 
initial stages of the crisis men might have been disproportionately affected 
(Béland et al., 2020a) and that some older workers might have chosen to go on 
early retirement (Coibion et al., 2020; Cowan, 2020).  
 
These studies also explore whether social distancing measures have 
disproportionally impacted specific categories of workers. Findings from this 
research show that jobs that cannot be performed from home are at higher risk, 
while, jobs in workplace classified as essential face lower risks (Béland et al., 
2020a; Cajner et al., 2020; Montenovo et al., 2020).  As an estimated 93% of 
workers around the world live in countries with some forms of workplace 
restrictions (ILOa, 2020), a large body of research across the world has focused on 
identifying vulnerable occupations, with a particular focus on jobs that cannot be 
performed from home and in sectors that have severely been affected by the 
shutdown (Diengel and Neiman, 2020; Garrote-Sanchez et al., 2020; Hatayama et 
al., 2020; Hicks et al., 2020; Mongey et al. 2020; Pouliakas and Branka, 2020; 
Saltiel, 2020). ILO (2020a) shows that while only 7.9% of workers around the world 
worked from home before the crisis, almost 18% are in jobs or have access to the 
infrastructure that could allow them to work from home in the future. This 
research also shows that working from home is more feasible in high-income 
countries (23%) than in low-income countries (13%). Focusing on Greece, 
Pouliakas (2020) shows that more than one third of jobs in the Greek labor market 
could be performed from home.    
    
A number of studies have tried to identify the channels driving the observed 
employment impacts. Using data from the United States’ Current Employment 
Statistics (CES), Brinca et al. (2020) try to disentangle the aggregate COVID shock 
in its demand and supply components. They observe that in April 2020 
employment in the private sector was significantly lower than its historical 
average and estimated that more than 65% of this impact was due to labor supply 
shocks, i.e. inability of workers to perform their jobs.  Kong and Prinz (2020) 
conclude that restaurant and bar limitations and non-essential business closures 
were the only transmission prevention measures that in the United States led to 
an increase in UI claims. Barrero et al. (2020) using forward-looking firm level data, 
find that the COVID-19 induced shocks lead to 3 new hires for every 10 layoffs. 
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They also project that the total number of entire working days performed from 
home will triple after the end of the pandemic and that between 32% and 42% of 
all layoffs will be permanent.  
 
Findings of research focused on the Canadian labor market are in line with the 
results in the United States. Using the Canadian Labor Force Survey up to April 
2020, Béland et al. (2020b) document substantial increases in unemployment 
(approximately 5 percentage points) and drops in labor force participation (3.7 
percentage points), hours worked (1.5 percentage points) and wages (0.4 
percentage points). These impacts were less severe for essential workers or 
workers who can work remotely, while they were more pronounced for younger 
and less educated workers. Differently from the results for the United States, they 
do not find evidence of differential effects by gender or of disproportionate 
impacts of the crisis on labor market outcomes for migrants.  
 
Adams-Prassl et al. (2020) compare the impacts of COVID=19 on jobs, earnings 
and hour worked in three countries that have introduced different policies in 
response to the pandemic, i.e. the UK, United States and Germany. They find 
substantial differences across and within countries. Job losses in the United States 
and the UK were substantially higher (18% and 15%) than in Germany (5%), a 
country with a well-established short-time work scheme. They point out that the 
UK also introduced a similar scheme, which however does not allow furloughed 
workers to do any work for their employers, thereby potentially discouraging firms 
from applying. Not surprisingly, the study also finds that furloughing was more 
prevalent in the UK (43%) than in the US (31%), a country that strongly relied on 
the expansion of unemployment benefits to respond to the crisis. The study also 
finds that in all countries, people who can work from home are less likely to lose 
their jobs. This is also the case for people with permanent contracts, fixed hours 
and in salaried jobs. In the US and the UK, less educated workers and women were 
found to be more likely to lose their jobs during the pandemic. This is not the case 
in Germany. Based on a survey covering China, Japan, Korea, US, UK, and Italy, 
Belot et al (2020) also find that young people are severely affected by the crisis in 
these countries. 
 
Focusing on Denmark, another country that introduced significant measures to 
encourage job retention, Bennedsen et al. (2020) provide additional evidence on 
the strong impact of these policies in helping firms keep their workers. Estimates 
presented in this study suggest that the policies introduced by the Danish 
Government contributed to a reduction in layoffs by 81,000 jobs and increase in 
furloughs by 285,000. Employment subsidies seem to have a stronger correlation 
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with job retention, while the correlation is weaker for cost subsidies and the 
evidence for tax subsidies is mixed. The authors conclude that labor subsidies 
meet their objective of preserving employer-employee relationships, while the 
impact of the other policies is less clear.  
 
Sweden is another example of a country that has leveraged on strong job retention 
interventions to respond to the crisis. Hensvick et al. (2020) study the impact of 
the COVID=19 crisis on job search using real-time data from the job board of the 
Swedish Public Employment Service. They find that between March and May 
employers posted 40% less vacancies. The drops were significant in sectors such 
as hotels and restaurants, and entertainment, as well as in occupations that are 
more difficult to perform from home. They also find that users reduced job-search 
intensity and seemed to have re-directed their searches to occupations that are 
more likely to be performed from home and more resilient to the crisis.  
 
Alstadsæter et al. (2020) study the impacts of COVID-19 on layoffs in Norway, a 
country that has strongly relied on unemployment insurance benefits to mitigate 
the impacts of the crisis. Their analysis based on UI claims data shows that almost 
all layoffs up to April 19 were temporary. Even if accounting for only 10% of the 
total number of layoffs, permanent layoffs generated a 1.5 percentage point 
increase in unemployment, a significant month-to-month variation for Norway. 
They also show that layoffs affect populations that are already financially 
vulnerable (low-income, low-educated, immigrants) and are more common in jobs 
that require physical proximity, especially in the initial phases of the crisis. 
Similarly, they find that in the early stages of the crisis, the impacts were mostly 
felt by women and young workers, but as time passed men and older workers 
were also significantly impacted.  
 
The Korean experience also provides interesting insights as the Government 
mainly relied on testing and tracing and less on lockdowns to contain the spread 
of the virus. Aum et al. (2020) find that a one per thousand increase in infections 
leads to an almost 3% decrease in local employment. They compare these effects 
to those in the UK and US, where lockdowns were introduced, and note that 
employment losses were almost double in these countries. Shedding light on the 
channels driving these results, the authors find that employment losses were 
mainly due to a slowdown in hiring by firms and to transition of workers out of the 
labor market rather than to unemployment. The authors note that at the time of 
publication, the Korean Government had not implemented any public furlough 
scheme. The paper also shows that employment losses were mainly experienced 
in small businesses (less than 30 employees), and that the workers with the 
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highest probability to lose their jobs were less educated, young, employed in low-
wage occupations, with temporary contracts, or self-employed. Men were also 
more affected than women. With the exception of the gender results, these 
results are similar to those found by other studies for the US and the UK.  
 
 
3. COVID-19 in Greece: Evolution and measures taken 
3.1 The spread of the virus and the lockdown measures 
The first case of COVID-19 in Greece was confirmed on February 26. Figure 1 shows 
the trend in new cases from that date. Compared to many other countries in 
Europe, where cases and fatalities exploded quickly, the pandemic progressed 
slowly in Greece.  
 
 
Figure 1. COVID-19 cases and public policy mitigation measures 
 
Source: Johns Hopkins University; University of Oxford, Blavatnik School of Government. 
Notes: Indices range from 0 to 100. The Containment & health index combines lockdown 
restrictions and closures with measures such as testing policy, contact tracing, short-term 
healthcare investment in healthcare, and investments in vaccine. The Economic support index 
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records measures such income support and debt relief. The Stringency index records the strictness 
of lockdown-style policies that primarily restrict behavior and activities. The first confirmed COVID-
19 case in Greece was reported on February 26, 2020. 
 
The Government has been credited with reacting quickly to the pandemic, 
introducing various restrictions even when cases and fatalities were quite low. For 
example, on March 10, before most of Europe, schools and universities 
nationwide were ordered closed, when there were just 89 confirmed cases and no 
deaths. The first virus-related death in Greece was recorded on March 12. The 
outbreak peaked in early April when new cases were approaching 100 per day. By 
April 21, there were 2,401 confirmed cases; 150 new cases, all asymptomatic, 
were related to one refugee facility located in Northern Greece. As of early July, 
Greece had around 3,500 confirmed cases and slightly less than 200 deaths from 
the virus. 
 
Even though the actual spread of the virus has been much lower than in most 
European countries, the impact on society and the economy has been substantial 
because of the strict lockdown measures. Figure 1 shows the rapid imposition of 
the lockdown, as shown by the steep rise in the Oxford/Blavatnik Stringency and 
Containment and Health Indices within the first three weeks after the initial 
recorded case.  
 
Some of the key measures put in place to slow the spread of the pandemic 
included cancellation of all carnival events (February 27), school closings (February 
27 at a regional level and closed down nationally on March 10), closing of all non-
essential workplaces (March 12-18), suspension of all public religious services 
(March 16), ban on gatherings of more than 10 people (March 19), internal and 
external travel restrictions (March 18-22), and finally, a general stay-at-home 
order (March 23), intensified by permanent roadblocks and checks of vehicles 
(April 8). The Government lifted the stay-at-home order on May 4, followed by the 
opening of schools, commercial activities, and workplaces (progressively from 
May 11, essentially completed by June 1).  
 
These measures affected all aspects of everyday life. This effect can be visualized 
through mobility data provided by Apple and Google, which is sent from users’ 
devices to these companies’ maps services.15 Using February 15 as the pre-
pandemic baseline, Figure 2 presents Apple Maps data to illustrate how driving 
 
15 Apple data: www.apple.com/COVID19/mobility; Google data: 
www.google.com/COVID19/mobility/. 
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and walking in Greece started to decline after the first cases but then fell sharply 
as soon as the lockdown and workplace closing measures were implemented. For 
much of the period between March 12 (workplace closings initiated) and May 4 
(end of the lockdown), driving and walking activity was well below 70% of February 
15 levels. Towards the end of the lockdown period, mobility started to slowly pick 
up and this continued through May and June and approached pre-pandemic 
levels, at least in the case of walking. 
 
Figure 2. Daily driving and walking activity
 
Source: Apple.  
Notes: Vertical lines are set at workplace closing (March 12) and at the end of the lockdown (May 
4). The baseline date is February 15. 
 
The lockdown effects are also reflected in market-related activities. Google 
mobility reports provide data on trends in visits to various types of places, which 
can be compared to the pre-pandemic baseline (February 15). Figure 3 (top panel) 
shows that visits to workplaces and use of public transit declined by 50%-80% 
during the lockdown compared to pre-pre-pandemic levels. The data again show 
the return (albeit partial) towards the pre-pandemic baseline after the lockdown 
was lifted. A similar pattern is observed for non-essential shops (using retail and 
 34 
recreation as an example), while essential retail (grocery stores and pharmacies) 
were not nearly affected to the same extent (Figure 3, bottom panel). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Daily activity for selected indicators 
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Source: Google Community Mobility Reports.  
Notes: Charts begin on 15 February 2020 (baseline date) after which Google data became available. 
Vertical lines are set at workplace closing (March 12) and at the end of the lockdown (May 4). 
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3.2 Economic impact and mitigation measures 
As expected, restrictions imposed by the Government as well as the demand shock 
that affected most sectors resulted in a major economic slowdown with significant 
consequences for businesses and workers. GDP for the 1st quarter of 2020 
decreased by 1.6% in comparison with the 4th quarter of 2019, while in 
comparison with the 1st quarter of 2019, the decline was 0.9%.16 Various 
projections from national and international agencies estimate that GDP will shrink 
between 5.7% and 10% in 2020. A key factor will be declining exports, and 
especially tourism and shipping.17 
 
To keep the economy afloat during the pandemic, the Greek government 
introduced a range of measures to support affected businesses and their 
employees. The government mobilized an immediate aid package amounting to 
6.8 billion euros (or 3.5% of GDP) for March and April and legislated an additional 
package of 24 billion euros in May in order to stimulate the restart of the economy 
in the aftermath of the crisis. 
 
The first legislative act to support businesses (March 11) was intended to provide 
firms with liquidity through the extension of tax and social contribution 
compliance deadlines, discounts on certified tax liabilities in case they were paid 
in due time, and suspension of debt payments. About 800,000 firms that had been 
financially affected in terms of a decline in their turnover or had ceased operation 
by state order were eligible for these and other benefits described below, on the 
condition of no layoffs.18 
 
On March 18, the Ministries of Finance and Labor announced and then legislated 
a new package of measures. The key component was the provision of an 800-euro 
stipend (covering the period from March 15 to April 30, eventually extended 
through May) to workers whose contracts had been suspended because of the 
suspension of operations of their enterprise. In addition, for these workers, the 
Government covered all social insurance contributions and all tax payments were 
suspended for a period of four months. The same measure was applied to 
freelancers, self-employed, and individual business owners with up to 20 
employees.10 Enterprises whose operations had been mandatorily suspended and 
affected employees were asked to pay just 60% of their rents for March to May.  
 
16  See Table 2 here.   
17 See the relevant Centre of Planning and Economic Research report here. 
18 The list of eligible businesses was defined by virtue of Ministerial Decision by the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF), included business activities (sectors) per Code of Business Activity and was updated 
regularly during the health crisis. The most recent version of the list is provided on the MoF website.  
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Overall, by early May, approximately 1.2 million employees and 550,000 self-
employed and freelancers had benefited from this scheme. A one-off stipend of 
600 euros in the form of a special training program was provided to specific 
professionals (economists/accountants, engineers, lawyers, doctors, teachers, 
and researchers) in April.19 These occupations became eligible for the €800 
financial support as of May. The budget allocation for the stipends for employees, 
freelancers/self-employed/individual businesses, and professionals is €2.36 
billion, with an additional €1.36 billion for the social insurance payments.20 
 
Additional funds were allocated to benefits for unemployed workers. On March 
20, a measure was introduced to extend payments of the regular unemployment 
benefit, the long-term unemployment benefit, and the unemployment allowance 
for the self-employed by 2 months for those whose entitlement ended on March 
31. The measure was then extended to cover those whose entitlement ended at 
the end of April and at the end of May. In addition, a lump sum stipend of €400 
was introduced for 155,000 long-term unemployed individuals, registered with 
the public employment agency (Hellenic Manpower Employment Organization 
(OAED)) from April 1, 2019 who were maintaining their status until April 16, 2020 
and were not receiving any other benefit from the State. The budget allocation for 
these measures related to unemployment benefits is about €300 million. 
 
In terms of numbers affected and financial commitment, the Government’s 
mitigation measures have emphasized the preservation of employment in 
enterprises where operations were suspended. A key condition of the benefits 
provided to affected businesses was that they were obliged to maintain the same 
headcount. In fact, layoffs in designated industries were temporarily prohibited 
from March 18 until the restriction was lifted on June 16. 
 
4. Data and methods 
This section briefly presents the data sources, relevant indicators, and the 
methods that are used to assess labor market adjustments in Greece due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic and the relevant mitigation policies.  
 
 
19 The eligibility criteria for the freelancers, self-employed and individual business owners who were 
entitled to such financial support were explained in Ministerial Decision 39162 ΕΞ 2020/ GG B’ 
1457/16.04.2020.  
20 Information regarding fiscal responses to the economic fallout from the coronavirus are provided 
by the Bruegel datasets; see here. 
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4.1. Labor market indicators 
We report monthly estimates from the Labor Force Survey (from ELSTAT) on the 
labor force participation rate, employment to population ratio, and 
unemployment rate for the periods January-April 2019 and January-April 2020 to 
see differences in trends before and during the lockdown.21   
 
We also use the LFS data to identify how other aspects of the Greek labor market 
have been affected by the COVID-19 crisis. In addition, to assess the degree of 
labor market slackness, we calculate the extended labor force indicator which is 
simply the active labor force plus the “potential additional labor force” (PALF), 
which takes into account persons seeking work but not immediately available and 
persons available for work but not seeking work.  
 
4.2. Unemployment claims 
As an indicator of the evolution of unemployment, we present data from OAED, 
the public employment agency, on the number of unemployment benefit 
recipients and the new claims for benefits covering the period from January 2017 
to May 2020.  
 
4.3. Labor market flows 
Administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA), ERGANI is the 
national employment registry in Greece and covers all registered employers who 
contribute to the Social Security System. The ERGANI monthly reports provide 
daily information on labor market flows in the private sector, and we use the 
reports from January 2018 through June 2020. More specifically, the data we 
analyze covers new hires, overall and by type (full-time, part-time and shift work), 
and separations (lay-offs, quits and contract terminations). On a monthly 
frequency, labor market flows are disaggregated by gender, age and region. In 
addition, we disaggregate these flows by occupation (2-digit) and sector of 
economic activity (2-digit) for the periods January-April 2019, and January-April 
2020.22  
 
 
21 It should be noted that the pandemic and mitigation measures affected the LFS data collection 
process, to some extent. From mid-March 2020 onwards, the LFS data collection switched from a 
blended style of personal and telephone interviews to solely telephone interviews. This decreased 
the response rate compared to previous months, especially in urban areas. The relevant ELSTAT 
press release is here. 
22 Due to data limitations in the ERGANI monthly reports, we extracted information on monthly 
labor market flows (January-April 2019 and January-April 2020) disaggregated by occupation (2-
digit) and sector of economic activity (2-digit) from the National Institute of Labor and Human 
Resources (NILHR) website. 
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Using ERGANI daily data, the change in daily flows since the onset of the pandemic 
and the government restriction on layoffs can be analyzed through a simple 
regression framework. More specifically, we adopt a single group interrupted time 
series analysis, in order to compare how outcomes change between the pre-
pandemic period and two post-pandemic sub-periods, i.e., one since the onset of 
the pandemic and one since the government intervention to protect jobs:  
 
yt = a + b1(ct×St) + b2(ct×Rt) + Wtd + ct + ut        
 (1) 
 
where y is the daily number of hires (or separations), S is dummy for the period 
after the onset of the pandemic (26 February 2020), R is a dummy switched on 
after the implementation of layoff restrictions (18 March 2020), c a linear daily 
time trend, and W is a vector of day-of-week fixed effects (i.e. d=1,…,7); u is an 
error term. Model (1) is estimated with negative binomial regressions and for two 
different sample sizes: (a) one for 2020 only, and (b) one covering the total period 
(2018-2020) for which ERGANI daily data is available. In the latter case, models 
additionally control for month and year fixed effects. Under the assumption that 
pre-pandemic labor market flows would have prevailed in the absence of the 
pandemic and the government responses to it, this method offer an approach for 
identifying COVID-19-related impacts on daily labor market activity. 
 
However, changing trends before and after the pandemic onset and the related 
government interventions could be driven by unobserved factors. To account for 
such unobservables, we follow Powdthavee et al. (2019) and Metcalfe et al. (2011) 
in constructing a “control group” of observations based on trends from earlier 
years unaffected by COVID-19. More specifically, we compare the size of weekly 
labor market flows during weeks after Greece was exposed to the virus (“treated” 
group) with weekly flows for previous years (“control”) group.23 The exposure 
period for hires begins after week 9 in 2020, corresponding to the first COVID-19 
case, while, for separations, the exposure period is after week 12 when layoffs 
were restricted by the Government. 
 
We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach, with the identifying 
assumption being that control and treated weeks move on parallel trends before 
the exposure period. This is tested visually as well as by including leads of the 
treatment for a sufficient number of weeks before (Autor, 2003; Cookson and 
Laliotis, 2017). The model is the following: 
 
 
23 Averaging over weeks for years before 2020 also smooths out any seasonal effects. 
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mit = α0 + α1Treati + α2Postt + α3Treati×Postt + eit     
 (2) 
 
where m is the number of hires (or separations) in week t (t=1,…,21) for group i 
(i=0,1), Treat is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the week is observed in 2020 and 0 
if observed before (average of weeks 2018-2019), Post is a dummy switched on 
during the exposure period for both groups (week 9 or 12) and e is an error term. 
In this quasi-experimental setup, the coefficient of interest is the one associated 
with the interaction of treatment and exposure period indicators, i.e., α3. As the 
lockdown was lifted on May 4, we restrict this analysis for weeks 1-21 so our DiD 
estimates are not affected by increased labor market activity due to relaxing 
restrictions. Under the pre-exposure parallel trends assumption, the estimated 
DiD coefficients will indicate the short-term labor market impacts of COVID-19. As 
in (1), the model is estimated using negative binomial regressions. 
 
4.4. Online vacancies 
Daily data on the number of vacancies posted online are extracted from the two 
most popular job search portals in Greece. In order to achieve a wide coverage of 
the market, we use Alexa’s ranking, which is web traffic data-based metric.24 An 
automated data acquisition mechanism was set up to scrape and store daily 
information on job postings from all selected portals. Extracted data were pre-
processed (e.g., string cleaning, language detection, avoid multiple entries per job 
ad and harmonization of company name and sectoral affiliation) before being used 
for the analysis. Advanced machine learning techniques were employed for 
deduplication. After deduplication, a total of 17,812 job vacancies were collected. 
Most job vacancies cover occupations such as sales and purchasing agents and 
brokers, administrative and specialized secretaries, administration professionals, 
transport and storage laborers, and information and communications technology 
professionals. A combination of Natural Language Processing and Name Entity 
Extraction/Recognition methods was adopted to extract the core information 
from the job postings. Examples of job posting fields extracted through this 
process include: job title, job description, job category, location, job type, contract 
type, experience, qualification, employer, employer type, firm location, firm size. 
The extracted data cover the period from January 2020 through June 2020. 
 
 
24 The the two highest-ranked job portals according to Alexa (www.alexa.com) are kariera.gr and 
jobfind.gr. Alexa’s traffic data take into account websites’ unique visitors and page views. A recent 
assessment conducted by Cedefop also lists kariera.gr and jobfind.gr among the top private job 
portals in Greece based on different sources, including a study conducted by ELSTAT in 2017 and 
based on number of advertisements, number of monthly visitors and Alexa ranking (Cedefop, 2018).  
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4.5. Job search and finding employment  
One additional question we investigate is whether the lockdown and economic 
slowdown may have reduced job search activity. To answer this question, we use 
individual-level data from the quarterly LFS to estimate the probability that those 
not working in a specific quarter were actively searching for a job during that 
quarter. The estimation sample consists of jobless individuals observed in the first 
quarters of 2017-2020 who lost their jobs over the previous two years. We 
estimate the following: 
 
Prob(Ui=1) = a + Y2020×[bqQqi + γΧi]+ εi     
 (3) 
 
where U indicates the i-th non-employed jobseeker, Y2020 is a dummy indicator 
which takes the value of 1 for the first quarter of 2020 and 0 for first quarters of 
earlier years, Q is a vector of quarter dummies (q=1,…,8) and X is a vector of 
observable individual characteristics, i.e. gender, age, country of birth, education, 
region and sector of economic activity in the individual’s last job, as well as 
indicators for the reason they stopped working (i.e. laid-off, contract termination, 
and other reasons).  
 
In addition, we estimate the probability of finding employment during the first 
quarter in each of 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020 for those were out of employment 
prior to that quarter. 
 
Prob(Ei=1) = α + Y2020×[βtTti + δZi]+ ηi      (4) 
 
where E indicates the i-th individual entered into employment, Y2020 is a dummy 
indicator which takes the value of 1 for the first quarter of 2020 and 0 for first 
quarters of earlier years, T is a vector of year dummies (t=2018, 2019, 2020) and 
X is a vector of individual characteristics, i.e. gender, age, country of birth, 
education, and region. Both models in (3) and (4) use a probit link function. 
 
 
5. Analysis of impacts on the labor market 
5.1. Labor market indicators 
Table 1 shows non-seasonally-adjusted monthly estimates of the main labor 
market indicators from the LFS since the onset of the pandemic. The February 
figures show the improvement in the Greek labor market during the period prior 
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to the pandemic.25 Most notably, the number of workers unemployed in February 
2020 was 16.9% lower than in 2019, corresponding to a nearly three percentage 
point drop in the unemployment rate (from 19.8% to 17%). On the eve of the 
pandemic, unemployment had been falling compared to the previous year and 
there had been a modest increase in employment.  
 
The data for March and April present the evolution of labor market conditions 
while the lockdown was in place. Normally these are months when seasonal 
factors lead to job creation and an improvement in labor indicators in Greece. In 
2020, employment numbers rose very slightly in March and April, less than they 
had in 2019.  The unemployment figures are interesting. Between February and 
March 2020, the number of unemployed actually decreased by 13.8%, larger than 
the decrease in 2019. However, as the lockdown continued in April, 
unemployment numbers rose by 9.8%. Yet unemployment in April 2020 was still 
14.3% lower than it had been a year earlier.  
 
Table 1. Main labor market indicators, February, March, and April, 2019 and 2020 
 February March April % change (monthly) 
 [1] [2] [3] [2] vs [1] [3] vs [2] 
2019 
[4] Employed 3758.9 3846.3 3884.3 2.3 1.0 
[5] Unemployed 928.0 844.0 852.6 -9.1 1.0 
[6] Inactive 3261.8 3254.4 3203.9 -0.2 -1.6 
2020 
[7] Employed 3779.2 3813.0 3839.3 0.9 0.7 
[8] Unemployed 771.6 665.4 730.3 -13.8 9.8 
[9] Inactive 3353.1 3423.1 3329.4 2.1 -2.7 
% change (annual) 
[7] vs [4] 0.5 -0.9 -1.2   
[8] vs [5] -16.9 -21.2 -14.3   
[9] vs [6] 2.8 5.2 3.9   
Source: Labor Force Survey (EL.STAT.) 
Notes: Seasonally unadjusted estimates for persons 15-74 years old.  
 
In part, the falling unemployment rates reflect higher inactivity, as jobless workers 
were less likely to search for work. Table 1 confirms that more workers were 
inactive in February 2020 than one year earlier. The pandemic accentuated this 
trend: in March inactivity increased by 2.1%. However, labor force participation 
statistics need to be carefully interpreted while the lockdown is in place since 
 
25 Disaggregated trends in the main labor market indicators for 2018Q1, 2019Q1, and 2020Q1 are 
in Appendix Table A.1. 
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some people who are counted as inactive might still have some attachment to the 
labor force. This is evident when we consider the “potential additional labor force” 
(PALF), which includes those “seeking work but who are not immediately 
available” and those “available for work and wanting to work but not currently 
seeking work” (Hornstein et al., 2014). According to LFS data, the size of the PALF 
increased by 40% in 2020Q1 compared to 2019Q1, and by 72% compared to 
2019Q4.26 This suggests that lockdown measures increased the underutilization of 
labor, with growing numbers awaiting recall, unable to look for jobs because of 
the lockdown, or discouraged by the lack of new job openings. As economic 
activity resumes, these marginally attached workers may be more likely to (re)join 
the labor force. 
5.2 Unemployment claims 
Figure 4 shows the monthly number of recipients of unemployment insurance 
benefits. The top panel shows overall beneficiaries, demonstrating a pattern 
which reflects the seasonal character of the Greek economy. The bottom panel 
shows that new claims for unemployment insurance benefits increased slightly in 
February and March 2020, and then tripled in April 2020. However, in May, initial 
claims moved back to a level and trend similar to that of earlier years.       
 
Figure 4. Unemployment insurance benefit recipients and new monthly claimants 
 
 
26 See ELSTAT Table 10 here. 
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Source: OAED Monthly Reports. Authors’ calculations. 
5.3 Labor market flows 
The employment registry, ERGANI, provides a unique data source since 
employment levels and flows in and out of employment can be tracked on a daily 
basis. Figure 5 presents the day-by-day employment for 2020, from the start of 
the year to the end of June. The first COVID case and the introduction of the 
workplace restrictions are marked with vertical lines on the chart so that the 
employment trend can be observed with reference to these key dates. In order to 
provide perspective on the 2020 numbers, a counterfactual trend line is included 
which estimates what the 2020 employment levels would have been if the daily 
2018 and 2019 patterns had prevailed in 2020. The chart also shows the actual 
numbers for 2018 and 2019. 
 
Figure 5 shows that employment started decreasing after COVID-19 appeared in 
Greece and this continued for a few days (about ten) during the lockdown period. 
At that point, employment levelled off and then gradually started increasing in 
May, when restrictions started to be relaxed. However, the employment impact is 
more striking when actual trends are compared with our best estimate of what 
the employment trajectory would have been in the absence of the pandemic and 
lockdown (i.e., based on 2018 and 2019 trends in daily changes).27 This modest 
increase in  employment corresponds to a period when job growth tends to be 
strong in Greece, because of seasonal factors primarily associated with the gearing 
 
27 This is our identifying assumption of our interrupted time series analysis, i.e. Equation (1). 
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up of the tourism industry. Comparing the actual employment to the 
counterfactual employment level results to a job deficit of 265,000 by end of June. 
This corresponds to a loss of 11.9% in total employment relative to a no-pandemic 
scenario.  
 
Figure 5. Observed and counterfactual daily employment levels for 2020 and employment levels 
for 2018 and 2019 
 
Source: ERGANI. 
Notes: Vertical lines are set in the days when the first COVID-19 case was identified (26 February 
2020) and when workplace restrictions were implemented (12 March 2020). 
 
Changes in employment levels are explained by trends in hires and separations. 
The impact on jobs we have observed in Greece is completely due to the effect of 
the pandemic on new hires. Figure 6 shows the daily progression in total new hires 
(top panel) and separations (bottom panel) and compares the actual to the 
counterfactual trends, calculated as before. The decline in new hires, compared 
to the counterfactual scenario, is apparent. This occurs for all types of hires, i.e., 
full-time, part-time and shift work (see Appendix Figure A.2).  
 
Figure 6. Total daily hires and separations before and after the pandemic onset, with comparison 
to counterfactual scenario 
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Source: ERGANI. Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Vertical line is set at the pandemic onset (February 26, 2020). 
 
On the other hand, as the bottom panel of Figure 6 shows, there is no evidence 
that separations have increased because of the pandemic and lockdown. In fact, 
the actual number of separations is below what would have been expected if the 
2018-19 trends had continued in 2020. This is true for layoffs, quits, and contract 
terminations (Appendix Figure A.1). Certainly, in the case of layoffs, this can be 
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explained by the Government measures to protect jobs by prohibiting layoffs in 
affected industries and by tying income support to the maintenance of 
employment relationships. The reduction in quits is not surprising since one would 
expect fewer workers to leave their jobs in a deteriorating labor market. It should 
be noticed that there is initial evidence of a small uptick in the number of 
separations at the end of the period, which may reflect the easing of the layoff 
restrictions.  
 
Using monthly data on net labor market flows, we observe that the crisis has 
affected sectors and occupations differently. Table 2 presents the difference 
between 2020 and 2019 in the size of net flows (new hires minus separations) for 
January, February, March, and April by sector of economic activity. The results 
suggest that the accommodation and food sector was particularly affected by the 
crisis. The negative impacts were especially severe in March and April, the months 
in which   tourism would normally be gearing up for the summer season. In March, 
accommodation and food services accounted for 52% of the 2020 net job 
decreases, relative to 2019, while by April, this share was 84%.  
 
Table 2. Comparison of net job flows between 2019 and 2020 by sector 
 Difference: Month 2020 – Month 2019  
NACE Rev. 2 sector of economic 
activity: 
January February March April 
Agriculture, forestry etc. 402 8 -413 -127 
Mining and quarrying 22 -75 -164 -58 
Manufacturing 1151 83 -5014 -482 
Electricity, gas, steam etc. -419 829 -42 -248 
Water supply; sewerage etc. -187 -188 -53 -18 
Construction 548 -383 -1472 292 
Wholesale and retail trade 1009 592 -7310 -8119 
Transportation and storage 500 371 -6556 -3572 
Accommodation and food service 3865 3415 -43120 -84491 
Information and communication -80 -665 -1965 447 
Financial and insurance activities -485 -188 -415 126 
Real estate activities -17 -34 -405 -769 
Professional, scientific and technical -634 -1303 -3000 -389 
Administrative and support service -688 -515 -4896 -3435 
Public administration, defense etc. -941 -2612 235 -260 
Education 299 -350 -1798 214 
Human health and social work 179 -846 -943 2038 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 573 -728 -4684 309 
Other service, households and extra  -119 -295 -1623 -2114 
Total additional jobs 4978 -2884 -83638 -100656 
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Source: ERGANI and National Institute of Labor and Human Resources (NILHR). Authors’ 
calculations. 
 
Table 3 presents a similar analysis by occupation. During March and April, the most 
affected group was workers employed in services and shop and market sales 
workers. This group accounted for a two-thirds of the total drop in net job flows 
in April. A large number of workers in this occupation in Greece are employed in 
the tourism sector. 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison of net job flows between 2019 and 2020 by occupation 
 Difference: Month 2020 – Month 2019  
NACE Rev. 2 sector of economic activity: January February March April 
Legislators, senior officials and 
managers -10 43 -641 -498 
Professionals 418 -2890 -3951 990 
Technicians and associate professionals 1970 -2018 -8894 -1362 
Clerks -951 -2508 -11418 -14781 
Service workers and shop and market 
sales workers 1333 3456 -35567 -66066 
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 43 -89 -417 -388 
Craft and related trades workers -156 491 -3285 -1452 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 511 -11 -7577 -3452 
Elementary occupations 1860 552 -13527 -16683 
Total additional jobs 5018 -2974 -85277 -103692 
Source: ERGANI and National Institute of Labor and Human Resources (NILHR). Authors’ 
calculations. 
 
 
We now turn to our more formal analysis of the impact of the pandemic on labor 
market flows, first using interrupted time series and then difference-in-difference 
estimates. Regarding the former, we regress the log of total new hires (or 
separations) on a day-of-week, month, year fixed effects and a linear time trend, 
and then plot the mean residual by week and year. The results are shown in Figure 
7; vertical lines are set at the weeks when the pandemic started and when 
restrictions on layoffs were implemented. The results confirm what we observed 
through the descriptive data analysis. There is a pronounced decline in new hires 
after the pandemic appeared and this decline started in those weeks during which 
new hires peaked in the pre-pandemic years. At the same time, separations were 
lower compared to the respective weeks of pre-pandemic “normal” years. 
 
As the data show signs of over-dispersion, Equation (1) is also estimated using 
negative binomial regression. Under this specification, b1 indicates the mean daily 
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change on each outcome after the onset of the pandemic and b2 denotes the 
effect of layoff restrictions. Estimation results are summarized in Table 4. The 
interrupted time series regression estimates confirm the graphical evidence. In 
2020, new hires decrease by a significant 1.12%, on average, each day during the 
pandemic crisis. The effect is more sizeable for part-timers (1.38%) and those in 
shift work (2.09%), although full-timers are the biggest group in the labor market. 
Moreover, it seems that the labor market responded with a slight delay, in terms 
of full-time hires, after the onset of the pandemic, although coefficient estimates 
are everywhere negative. On the other hand, separations are significantly 
decreased relative to pre-pandemic days. This is true especially for firings which, 
as already noted, were restricted during the crisis.  
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Figure 7. Residual hires and separations by week and year 
 
 51 
 
 Source: ERGANI. Authors’ calculations. 
Table 4. Pandemic onset and layoff restriction effects on hires and separations: Interrupted time 
series estimates. 
 Days since 
pandemic 
Days since  
layoff 
restrictions 
Days since 
pandemic 
Days since  
layoff 
restrictions 
Dependent variable: [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Total new hires -.0112*** 
(.0029) 
-.0058**  
(.0023) 
.0002  
(.0020) 
-.0047**  
(.0019) 
Full-time new hires -.0071*** 
(.0027) 
-.0055***  
(.0020) 
.0011  
(.0019) 
-.0049***  
(.0019) 
Part-time new hires -.0138***  
(.0031) 
-.0056**  
(.0025) 
-.0007  
(.0021) 
-.0044**  
(.0021) 
Shift-work new hires -.0209***  
(.0038) 
-.0079***  
(.0031) 
-.0011  
(.0028) 
-.0049*  
(.0028) 
Total separations -.0001  
(.0030) 
-.0070***  
(.0022) 
.0050***  
(.0017) 
-.0099***  
(.0016) 
Quits .0020  
(.0028) 
-.0087***  
(.0020) 
.0060***  
(.0016) 
-.0103***  
(.0015) 
Firings .0041  
(.0031) 
-.0120***  
(.0020) 
.0075***  
(.0016) 
-.0137***  
(.0014) 
Contract terminations -.0031  
(.0037) 
-.0028 
(.0031) 
.0024  
(.0028) 
-.0077***  
(.0025) 
Day of week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Month fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Daily time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period covered 01 Jan 2020 – 30 
Jun 2020 
01 Jan 2020 – 
30 Jun 2020 
01 Jan 2018 – 30 
Jun 2020 
01 Jan 2018 – 30 
Jun 2020 
Observations 182 182 912 912 
Source: ERGANI. Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Negative binomial regression estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 1%.  
 
Turning to the DiD estimates, this approach requires an identifying assumption 
that control and treated weeks move on parallel trends before the exposure 
period. To assess this, we have graphed weekly trends for total employment, hires, 
and separations for both time periods (see Appendix Figure A.2). In each case, the 
figures show that the trends move in parallel before the outbreak.  
 
Table 5 presents the DiD results for cumulative employment, total new hires and 
total separations. Results for the last two variables are also presented by type of 
hire and separation. In all cases, the estimated DiD parameters are sizeable and 
highly significant confirming that the labor market impact of the pandemic has 
been quite severe, at least in the short-run. Cumulative employment and new 
hires (overall and by job type) in 2020 fell substantially after week 9, relative to 
the control group. For separations, the exposure period is set at week 12 when 
the government intervened to restrict layoffs. The associated DiD coefficients, 
overall and by separation type, are also sizeable and significant.  
 
In addition to the graphical evidence confirming that employment, hires, and 
separations trended similarly before the pandemic onset and the layoff 
restrictions (Appendix Figure A.2), we also report results of an additional test. In 
this test outcomes are regressed on the set of controls already controlled for in 
Table 5, plus leads of the interaction term (Equation (2)) that range from one to 
five weeks before the actual treatment takes place. The size and significance of 
those estimates will indicate how the series trended before the treatment period 
(Table 6).  
 
Table 5. Pandemic and layoff restriction effects on labor market: Difference-in-differences 
results. 
  DiD 
coefficient 
Treatment group  
coefficient 
Treatment period  
coefficient1 
Dependent variable: [1] [2] [3] 
Cumulative employment -.0602*** (.0092) .0964*** (.0034) .0127 (.0128) 
Total new hires -1.196*** (.1718) .1138* (.0624) .5483** (.2312) 
Full-time hires -1.097*** (.1594) .1171 (.0724) .6174*** (.2218) 
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Part-time hires -1.264*** (.2009) .1326** (.0651) .4919* (.2524) 
Shift work hires -1.558*** (.2978) .0432 (.1037) .5835 (.3558) 
Total separations -1.330*** (.1650) .1539 (.1113) .1702 (.1590) 
Firings -1.407*** (.2076) .1711 (.1101) .1748 (.2052) 
Quits -1.236*** (.1576) .1507* (.0812) .1066 (.1462) 
Contract terminations -1.423*** (.2167) .1481 (.1702) .2550 (.2176) 
Source: ERGANI. Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Negative binomial regression estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models 
include a constant and a weekly linear trend. Sample size covers weeks 1-21 (lockdown lifting) and 
the effective observations are 42 in all models (21 weeks; 2 groups). 1 Treatment period for 
cumulative employment and hires is week 9 onwards (pandemic onset). Treatment period for 
separations runs from week 12 onwards (layoff restrictions). 
*** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 1%. 
 
Table 6. Testing for parallel trends before the treatment period. 
 -5 weeks 
lead 
-4 weeks 
lead 
-3 weeks 
lead 
-2 weeks 
lead 
-1 weeks 
lead 
0 weeks 
lead 
Dependent variable: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Cumulative employment -.008* 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.001) 
-.005*** 
(.001) 
-.002 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.051*** 
(.008) 
Total new hires -.050 
(.076) 
.372*** 
(.021) 
-.222*** 
(.021) 
.076*** 
(.021) 
-.001 
(.021) 
-1.28*** 
(.157) 
Full-time hires -.120** 
(.052) 
.486*** 
(.018) 
-.345*** 
(.018) 
.065*** 
(.018) 
-.086*** 
(.018) 
-1.05*** 
(.149) 
Part-time hires -.039 
(.106) 
.289*** 
(.023) 
-.128*** 
(.023) 
.075*** 
(.023) 
.060** 
(.024) 
-1.421*** 
(.192) 
Shift work hires .199* 
(.110) 
.232*** 
(.034) 
-.048 
(.033) 
.131*** 
(.034) 
.082** 
(.033) 
-1.878*** 
(.288) 
Total separations -.148 
(.126) 
.020 
(.017) 
.197*** 
(.017) 
.025 
(.017) 
.015 
(.017) 
-1.437*** 
(.149) 
Firings -.141 
(.108) 
-.010 
(.020) 
.324*** 
(.020) 
.162*** 
(.020) 
.411*** 
(.020) 
-2.050*** 
(.179) 
Quits -.244*** 
(.090) 
-.032** 
(.015) 
.215*** 
(.015) 
.190*** 
(.015) 
.094*** 
(.015) 
-1.472*** 
(.154) 
Contract terminations -.050 
(.196) 
.075*** 
(.023) 
.143*** 
(.023) 
-.209*** 
(.023) 
-.422*** 
(.023) 
-.983*** 
(.174) 
Source: ERGANI. Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Negative binomial regression estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models 
include a constant and a weekly linear trend. Sample size covers weeks 1-21 (lockdown lifting) and 
the effective observations are 42 in all models (21 weeks; 2 groups). 1 Treatment period for 
cumulative employment and hires is week 9 onwards (pandemic onset). Treatment period for 
separations runs from week 12 onwards (layoff restrictions).  
*** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 1%. 
For cumulative employment, the results confirm the parallel trend hypothesis for 
treated and control groups before the pandemic. The estimated coefficients are 
not significant and remarkably low; the effect comes when specifying a zero weeks 
lead and it is comparable to the respective DiD estimate from Table 5. No clear 
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patterns emerge when considering hires-related outcomes, the effects on the zero 
weeks lead coefficient are in line with the reported DiD estimates. When 
considering separations, there are some sizeable and positive effects taking place 
even three weeks before the actual treatment takes place. This is also in line with 
the graphical evidence (Figure 8), indicating that there might have been some 
anticipation of the pandemic in terms of labor market activity that induced the 
government to step in and restrict layoffs. Hence despite an upward tendency in 
separations, these were drastically reduced from week 12 onwards. Again, the 
coefficients when specifying a zero-week lead are comparable with the DiD 
estimates shown before. 
 
5.4 Online vacancies 
To further understand hiring dynamics during the crisis, we use daily data from 
two popular online job portals in Greece (www.kariera.gr and www.jobfind.gr). 
Following Hensvik et al. (2020), we measure the changes in labor demand by the 
average daily inflows of new vacancies. Although we do not have evidence to 
assess the representativeness or coverage of these data, the number of vacancies 
posted on them is consistent with the sharp decline in new hires reported in 
ERGANI. The results, summarized in Figure 8, show a steep decrease in new 
vacancies posted on both sites corresponding to the implementation of the 
workplace restrictions in March. There seems to be a slight but fluctuating 
increase in job postings in May as the restrictions were lifted but the number of 
new postings was still far below pre-pandemic levels. 
 
Figure 8. Job vacancy postings, kariera.gr and jobfind.gr, January-May 2020 
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Source: kariera.gr and jobfind.gr 
5.5 Job search and finding employment  
We also look at the impact of the pandemic on job search behaviors and on the 
likelihood of finding employment. First, we use the LFS micro dataset to estimate 
Equation (2) and to assess the probability that those not employed are actively 
seeking work. The associated marginal effects are shown in Table 7.  
 
Table 7. Job seeking during the COVID-19 pandemic 
 2019-2020 2017-2020 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Reasons for stop working     
Laid-off -.128*** 
(.034) 
-.112*** 
(.035) 
-.156*** 
(.031) 
-.139*** 
(.031) 
Contract termination -.143*** 
(.023) 
-.144*** 
(.023) 
-.163*** 
(.022) 
-.158*** 
(.022) 
Other -.047 
(.045) 
-.046 
(.045) 
.018 
(.043) 
.022 
(.043) 
Quarters since stop working     
0 (current quarter) - -.383*** 
(.079) 
- -.467*** 
(.069) 
1 - -.135*** 
(.031) 
- -.130*** 
(.031) 
2 - -.022 
(.043) 
- -.065* 
(.039) 
3 - -.222*** 
(.062) 
- -.210*** 
(.060) 
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4 - -.070 
(.065) 
- -.134** 
(.056) 
5 - -.148*** 
(.056) 
- -.164*** 
(.054) 
6 - -.049 
(.057) 
- -.027 
(.056) 
7 - -.054 
(.056) 
- .028 
(.055) 
Observations 3416 7637 
Source: EL.STAT, Quarterly Labor Force Survey-LFS (2017 – 2020, 1st quarter). 
Notes: Reported estimates are average marginal effects drawn from a probit model (interaction 
effects model) and correspond to the post 2020Q1 period (additive effect). Based on the ILO 
definition of unemployment, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the individual is 
considered to be unemployed and 0 otherwise. Sample includes all individuals (aged 25-54) who 
have stopped working during the last 8 quarters (2 years). All models include controls for gender, 
age, country of birth, education, region and sector of economic activity of the last job. In 
parentheses, white heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are reported. All estimates are 
weighted using the sampling weights provided by the EL.STAT. 
*** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 1%.  
 
We observe (column 2) that, for those who had been laid-off, the probability of 
searching for work during the first quarter of 2020 was 11.2 percentage points 
lower than in the first quarter of 2019.   For those who were not working because 
their last employment contract had been terminated, the drop in the probability 
of searching employment was even stronger, i.e.  14.4 percentage points lower. 
The largest drop was experienced by those who had lost their job within the 
current quarter (38.3 percentage points). This suggests that the slackness of the 
labor market in the first quarter of 2020 mostly affected the newly jobless 
individuals. These results are confirmed even when additional years of first 
quarters are added in the model (column 4).  
We now turn to the estimation results of the probability of finding employment 
during the 1st quarter of 2020. Table 8 presents the estimated marginal effects of 
the probit model described in equation (3). We observe (column 2) that the 
probability of finding employment in the first quarter of 2020 was 4.6 percentage 
points lower than during the first quarter of 2019. When additional years are 
added (columns 3 and 4), we observe that the estimated marginal effect for the 
first quarter of 2020 compared to the corresponding quarter of 2017 is negative 
although only marginally significant. These results suggest that the slackness of 
the labor market in the first quarter of 2020 may well have contributed to slowing 
down the employment prospects of jobless individuals.      
 
Table 8. Employment entry during the onset of COVID pandemic 
 2019-2020 2017-2020 
Year start work [1] [2] [3] [4] 
2020 -.045*** -.046*** -.017* -.016 
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(.010) (.010) (.009) (.009) 
2019 - - .028*** 
(.010) 
.029*** 
(.010) 
2018 - - .001 
(.009) 
.001 
(.009) 
Fixed effects - Yes - Yes 
Observations 3802 7942 
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority (EL.STAT.), Quarterly Labor Force Survey-LFS (2017 – 2020, 
1st quarter). 
Notes: Reported estimates are average marginal effects drawn from a probit model (the first year 
serves as the reference category, i.e., 2019 and 2017 in columns 1-2 and 3-4, respectively). Based 
on the ILO definition of employment, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the individual 
has start working in the current employer during the last 3 months and 0 otherwise. Sample 
includes all individuals (aged 15-54) who have start working any month during the last 8 quarters 
(2 years). In all models fixed effects include controls for gender, age, country of birth, education, 
region. In parentheses, white heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors are reported. All 
estimates are weighted using the sampling weights provided by the EL.STAT. *** at 1%, ** at 5% 
and * at 1%.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In many respects, Greece has been an interesting case for studying the COVID-19 
pandemic and its impacts on employment. The virus itself has been controlled well 
when compared to other countries in Europe and elsewhere in the OECD. To a 
significant degree, this was due to a stringent lockdown quickly imposed by the 
Government after the first cases were confirmed in late February. Even without 
widespread contagion, though, the pandemic has had an important economic 
impact, with GDP expected to decrease as much as 10% in 2020.  
 
The timing of the pandemic and lockdown is also an important part of the Greek 
story, in two ways. First, COVID-19 arrived at a point when the economy seemed 
to be finally on a sustainable growth path after the economic crisis that had 
persisted for the past decade. Second, the lockdown covered a period when the 
heavily seasonal Greek economy, quite reliant on tourism, would normally be 
gearing up and creating large numbers of jobs – something that could not happen 
in the spring of 2020. This is important to keep in mind in order to fully understand 
how the labor market has been affected by COVID-19 crisis. A final characteristic 
of the Greek experience was the Government decision to mitigate the economic 
consequences of the crisis by introducing regulatory and income support 
measures to maintain employment relationships. This has had an important effect 
on how the lockdown and the reduced labor demand have played out in the labor 
market.  
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We use administrative, survey, and online vacancy data to analyze how 
employment in Greece was affected during the first few months of the COVID-19 
pandemic and lockdown. Our main findings are the following: First, in the early 
months of the lockdown, labor force participation and unemployment fell, while 
there was very little change in employment levels. Second, job search activity 
declined, both because of continued attachment to employers who had 
suspended operations and because of almost no hiring activity. Third, by the end 
of June, we estimate that (registered) employment was 11.9% less than it should 
have been, based on trends from the previous two years. Fourth, this lost 
employment was entirely due to the sharp decline in hiring activity in the first few 
months of the crisis. This is evident from both the administrative and online 
vacancy data. As noted above, the early months spanned a period when seasonal 
activities, especially related to tourism, would normally be expanding and this 
needs to be taken into consideration in assessing the impact of the crisis. Most of 
the “missing” jobs thus far in 2020 have been in accommodation and food, which 
reflects the pandemic’s effect on the tourism. Fifth, and somewhat unexpectedly, 
separations to the end of May were lower than would be predicted based on the 
trends from recent years. This almost certainly was due to the Government 
measures to protect existing employment relationships. This was done through a 
prohibition of layoffs in industries affected by the crisis and by tying the major 
form of income support to the maintenance of jobs. 
 
To sum up, the analysis points to the important role that policy has played in 
determining how the Greek labor market has adjusted to the pandemic and 
lockdown. The measures put in place by the Government to mitigate the effects 
of the crisis on employers and workers emphasized job protection. The decreased 
labor demand, then, translated into a downturn in hiring rather than increases in 
separations that would lead to higher unemployment.  In this respect, Greece has 
been similar to some other European countries that have adopted measures to 
avoid layoffs. This stands in contrast to some other countries, like the US and 
Canada, where unemployment rose quickly as policies emphasized income 
support more than job protection. Of course, it is still far too early to assess the 
efficacy of the different approaches. However, at least in the short run, the policy 
stance adopted by Greece and others to maintain employment relationships 
where possible seems to have had positive attributes.  
 
We are still, of course, in the early days when it comes to understanding how 
COVID-19 is affecting labor markets in Greece and elsewhere. The analysis in this 
paper largely covers just the lockdown period and does not include analysis of 
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what is happening to employment as Greece emerges from the lockdown and 
implements a “new normal” which may or may not include further lockdowns. So, 
there is an important research agenda going forward. 
 
In the next stage of our research, we plan to assess three topics. First, an in-depth 
examination of how the impacts of the pandemic and lockdown were distributed 
across different types of workers, different occupations and industries, and 
different parts of the country. Second, an updated analysis of the labor market 
and employment relations adjustments as Greece emerges from the lockdown 
and as the mitigation measures are phased out. Third, the medium-term impacts 
of the mitigation strategies based on maintaining employment relationships 
rather than income support for workers who have lost their jobs. This last issue is 
particularly relevant for the ongoing debate in labor market policy about 
protecting jobs vs. protecting workers. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Labor market indicators, Greece, Q1 for 2018-2020 
 Labor force participation (%) Employment to population (%) Unemployment (%) 
 2018Q
1 
2019Q1 2020Q1 2018Q1 2019Q1 2020Q1 2018Q1 2019Q1 2020Q1 
Age 15 and over 
Total  51.62 51.78 50.61 40.68 41.83 42.21 21.19 19.21 16.21 
Men 59.79 59.70 58.80 49.48 50.52 50.72 17.24 15.37 13.73 
Women 44.01 44.42 43.01 32.48 33.75 34.69 26.18 24.02 19.35 
Age group 
15-19 5.15 4.87 3.83 2.31 2.42 2.52 55.22 50.21 34.22 
20-24 43.76 41.80 39.46 24.95 25.21 25.86 42.97 39.69 34.47 
25-29 81.66 84.15 80.44 56.23 60.36 59.49 31.13 28.27 26.05 
30-34 86.89 86.97 85.87 67.49 66.68 70.55 22.32 23.33 17.84 
35-39 88.03 87.67 85.57 69.69 71.21 72.18 20.84 18.77 15.65 
40-44 88.21 87.84 85.90 71.87 73.91 74.20 18.53 15.85 13.62 
45-49 84.39 85.86 85.57 68.50 71.06 73.82 18.83 17.24 13.74 
50-54 77.17 78.72 78.47 65.03 67.87 68.24 15.72 13.78 13.03 
55-59 60.97 62.40 61.48 50.65 53.22 53.86 16.93 14.70 12.39 
60-64 33.69 36.67 37.40 28.31 31.60 32.78 15.98 13.82 12.37 
65-74 6.82 7.38 7.93 6.08 6.50 7.25 10.88 11.89 8.66 
Country of birth (15 and over) 
Greece 50.50 50.51 49.53 40.31 41.51 42.08 20.18 17.82 15.03 
Foreign 67.52 68.77 66.01 45.98 46.13 47.05 31.90 32.93 28.72 
Region 
Eastern Macedonia & 
Thrace 
49.21 50.62 48.95 41.13 42.12 40.79 
16.43 16.79 16.66 
Central Macedonia 50.70 50.68 49.25 39.58 40.40 39.76 21.94 20.28 19.25 
Western Macedonia 50.24 50.24 45.87 36.14 36.63 36.98 28.06 27.08 19.39 
Epirus 47.58 46.35 45.85 36.72 38.63 37.82 22.82 16.64 17.53 
Thessaly 50.41 50.46 48.82 41.29 41.10 40.90 18.09 18.55 16.22 
Ionian Islands 51.37 48.54 45.56 38.07 38.78 39.37 25.89 20.09 13.59 
Western Greece 50.74 50.89 48.55 37.81 37.86 38.64 25.47 25.61 20.41 
Central Greece 50.06 48.77 49.38 40.10 39.78 39.83 19.89 18.43 19.34 
Attica 52.60 53.33 53.14 41.43 43.54 45.57 21.24 18.35 14.25 
Peloponnese 52.80 51.38 51.84 44.39 44.48 46.26 15.92 13.44 10.76 
Northern Aegean 54.24 54.99 53.66 40.96 43.86 44.93 24.48 20.24 16.27 
Southern Aegean 55.51 55.93 46.10 42.14 40.91 39.63 24.08 26.85 14.02 
Crete 53.40 53.82 52.97 42.76 44.92 43.94 19.92 16.54 17.05 
Source: LFS, ELSTAT 
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Figure A.1. Daily observed and counterfactual hires and separations by type before and after the 
pandemic onset 
 
Number of new hires by type Number of separations by type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ERGANI. 
Notes: Vertical line is set at the pandemic onset (February 26, 2020). 
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Figure A.2. Trends in labor market flows for treatment and control groups. 
  
 
Panel A. Cumulative employment by week 
 68 
 
 
Panel B. Total new hires 
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Panel C. Total separations 
 
Source: ERGANI. Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Vertical lines are set in weeks 9, 12 and 21 to indicate the pandemic onset, the layoffs 
restrictions and the end of our estimation sample (lockdown lifting), respectively. 
 
For employment and new hires, there is a common trend up to week 9, and then 
there is a visible break in the trend for the treatment group (2020). For total 
separations, the trend for both groups is common up to week 11. Total weekly 
separations in 2020 are on a slightly higher level, compared to the control group, 
in weeks 9-11; however there is a sharp reduction after week 12 when the 
government restricted layoffs to protect the number of jobs. These observations 
hold even when looking within total new hires and total separations. 
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ABSTRACT  
This paper investigates the incidence, trends and determinants of remote work in 
Greece. A crisis-stricken country in the years preceding the Covid-19 crisis, Greece 
entered the first wave of the public health shock as a laggard in digitalisation and 
remote work arrangements among European countries. While Covid-19 induced a 
spike in the use of remote work arrangements in many countries, this paper presents 
evidence that working from home (WfH) in Greece was subdued in the past decade. 
By analysing the profile of the job tasks and skill needs of Greek homeworkers, the 
paper also shows marked deviations in homeworking patterns and determinants in 
Greece, relative to other EU countries. This includes a higher prevalence of WfH 
among Greek females and non-nationals, limited use by young workers and families 
with children and a stronger relation with atypical work hours. While remote workers 
in Greece receive a 7% monthly wage premium, their jobs are found to involve 
standardised and moderate ICT tasks and to rely more on social serving tasks. The 
paper highlights that there is significant scope to enhance remote work in Greece, 
which can amount to up to 37% of all salaried jobs, subject to changing work 
organisation, norms and policies. In the coronavirus era, overcoming barriers to 
remote work will be key for the Greek labour market to adapt to social distances 
practices and digitalisation. 
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1. Introduction 
One stark impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and its associated confinement measures 
has been the growing numbers of individuals forced to work from home (WfH). At a 
time of choosing between exposing one’s health by working in close physical 
proximity to other people in a workplace and remote work, the latter option 
presented itself with major benefits. These did not only include the possibility of 
stemming job and economic losses (Adams Prassl et al., 2020), but also an ability to 
alleviate extraordinary child care demands caused by school and crèche closures and 
safeguarding personal and family health. Home-based work could have also 
contributed towards the flattening of the Covid-19 curve and be a measure of control 
for further spikes in SARS-Cov-2 cases, in addition to ensuring continued economic 
performance (Redmond and McGuinness, 2020). 
With more than 80% of the world population in lockdown at a given point (ILO, 
2020a), what had been a limited work arrangement before the pandemic, affecting 
about 15-17% of EU workers on average (Eurofound-ILO, 2017; Eurofound, 2020), 
became widely used to safeguard against the possibility of complete job loss, 
furlough or business closure. While reliable statistics on how many individuals 
actually worked remotely from home during the Covid-19 crisis are yet to be 
developed29, several economists have hinted to the fact that over a third of all jobs 
in advanced economies could potentially be performed from home (Dingel and 
Neiman, 2020; Boeri et al., 2020) and that the Covid-19-induced shift to homework is 
likely to have a long-term impact on future work organisation (Baert et al., 2020). 
The cost of the Covid-19 lockdown and confinement measures, and subsequent 
economic disruption, is likely to have been lower for those countries that already 
benefitted from higher shares of employed persons utilising some form of remote 
work.30 Similarly, countries that enjoyed a relatively advanced level of technological 
or digital maturity in terms of infrastructure and skills, organisational preparedness, 
as well as managerial competence and attitudes, would have also managed to adapt 
faster and with greater ease to the forced demand for remote work due to the 
 
29  Some polls have reported that the percentage of people who say they have worked 
“remotely” has roughly doubled, up to 62%, from the beginning of the virus-related changes in March 
until April. 59% of those who WfH said they would like to keep working this way 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/306695/workers-discovering-affinity-remote-work.aspx  
30  The term ‘remote work’ is used in this paper as it is an overarching description of the 
phenomenon whereby workers perform their work activities outside of their employers’ premises, 
either from home or elsewhere.  The focus of the analysis is on ‘working from home (WfH)’, which is a 
key facet of remote work. Homeworking includes teleworking/ICT-mobile work, which typically refers 
to work carried out from home, making use of remote information and communication technologies, 
but also integrates bringing work home after office hours (Song and Gao, 2018). Teleworking can be 
generally distinguished according to the place of work (home, office, elsewhere) and 
intensity/frequency of use of ICT (Eurofound-ILO, 2017). As the LFS data does not have information 
about workers’ use of ICT when WfH, the use of the term ‘teleworking’ is generally avoided in the 
paper. 
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coronavirus crisis. As WfH is not feasible for all groups of workers, most notably for 
those employees considered ‘essential’ or at the frontline of tackling the pandemic 
consequences, countries with an industrial and occupational structure conducive 
towards remote work should also have managed to adapt better. 
Entering what has been the most serious public health crisis of recent times, Greece 
was a country carrying already the heavy toll of its preceding economic and financial 
debt crisis. Enforced austerity policies during the previous decade as part of the 
country’s economic restructuring or Memoranda programmes, heightened concerns 
about the potentially crippling effects such policy measures had on the country’s 
strained public health care system (Economou et al., 2014; Kotsakis, 2018; 
Kyriopoulos et al., 2019).  
Greece was also ranked at the bottom of European Union (EU) countries in terms of 
its overall digital preparedness (European Commission 2019), including in indicators 
such as connectivity and internet access, use of digital services in the public sector, 
use of ICT technologies at home or work, integration of digital technologies within 
businesses and, most importantly, insufficiency of its digital skills base (Cedefop, 
2018). The country’s heavy reliance on a small-and-medium-sized firm base is also 
believed to be a contributory factor to its lower exposure and use of digital 
technologies (IOBE, 2018), evidenced by the low concentration of workers in digitally 
intensive occupations (SEV, 2020a). Overall, the country suffers from a marked 
‘digital divide’, with significant socioeconomic differences in access to and use of 
digital technologies and information tools (Demousis and Giannakopoulos, 2004; 
Cedefop, 2016; Paidousi, 2020; Lintzeris, 2020). The above deficiencies explain why 
the country was ranked 53rd of 63 countries in the IMD World Digital Competitiveness 
ranking31, which measures the capacity and readiness of economies to adapt and 
explore digital technologies as a key driver for economic transformation in business, 
government and wider society. 
Furthermore, the Greek economy has traditionally been more heavily reliant than 
other EU countries on the provision of economic activities that entail interactive 
service provision, most notably via its significant tourism industry as well as its 
relatively larger wholesale and retail trade and public administration service sectors. 
This is another factor which weighed heavily on the country’s ability to mitigate the 
adverse economic and social consequences of the Covid-19 shock32. 
 
31 https://www.imd.org/wcc/world-competitiveness-center-rankings/world-digital-
competitiveness-rankings-2019/  
32  See Greece’s Mechanism for Labour Market Diagnosis for an analysis of the impact of Covid-
19 on the Greek labour market https://lmd.eiead.gr/covid19/ 
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Figure 1. % of employed persons WfH, EU-27 and UK, NO, IS, CH, 2019 
 
 
NB: Summation of employed persons WfH sometimes or usually.  
Source : European Labour Force Survey, Eurostat [lfsa_ehomp] 
 
Because of the above reasons, but also cultural and social traits, Greece was also one 
of the EU countries with the lowest incidence of employed individuals WfH in the pre-
coronavirus era (Eurostat, 2020). As shown in Figure 1, Greece was ranked 24th out 
of 31 countries in terms of the share of employed persons working either sometimes 
or usually from home in 2019. Only 5.3% of all employed persons worked remotely 
in Greece, higher than in neighbouring Italy, Bulgaria and Cyprus, but considerably 
lower than the EU-27 average of 14% and the very high shares of homeworking (over 
37%) observed in the leading countries of Sweden and Netherlands.  
Despite the many challenges that the crisis-stricken country was faced with, it 
experienced a very low Covid-19 toll during the first wave of the 2020 coronavirus 
infection33. But το ensure good public health outcomes in the medium-term and 
assist the implementation of necessary social distancing practices, WfH will have to 
be used by a larger part of the Greek workforce. Organisational and public policies to 
promote the further entrenchment of home- and online working in Greece will also 
be necessary so that it does not fall behind the bandwagon of other EU and advanced 
economies, given that distance work arrangements are expected to become more 
widespread in the aftermath of the pandemic. 
The aim of this paper is to examine the evolution and determinants of WfH in Greece 
in the decade preceding the Covid-19 public health episode. Using Labour Force 
Survey data for the period 2008-2018, the study examines how the share of stay-
 
33  At the time of writing, Greece had about 3287 confirmed SARS-Cov-2 cases and 190 deaths.  
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home workers changed over time in relation to the changing socioeconomic, 
industrial and occupational structure of the economy.  
A value added of the study is the investigation of the type of tasks and skill needs 
characterising the jobs of Greek remote workers, which provides additional insight 
into the nature of their work. The paper also engages in a comparison of the 
divergence between the typical tasks profile of the jobs of average EU and Greek 
homeworkers. Moreover, it provides an assessment of the deviation between the 
historical and ‘technically feasibility’ of remote working in the country, which 
highlights the degree of investment required so that Greek workers and organisations 
can exploit its full potential. Finally, it also examines how the earnings of Greek 
workers is related to remote work arrangements, after accounting for the content 
and task profile of their jobs. 
Section 2 engages in a review of the literature on the determinants and impact of 
WfH, with specific coverage of recent analyses spurred by the Covid-19 episode. 
Section 3 outlines the data and provides summary statistics. Section 4 describes the 
empirical methodology used to analyse the evolution, determinants and potential of 
homeworking in Greece. Section 5 describes main empirical findings. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
As a response to the Covid-19 crisis a significant volume of new research has taken 
place investigating the extent to which home-based work can be further deployed as 
a means of safeguarding jobs and ensuring continued business operations. This 
research supplements a first generation of studies that preceded the Covid-19 wave, 
which had produced relatively inconclusive evidence on the balance of the positive 
(work flexibility and autonomy, work-family balance, reduced commuting time, job 
satisfaction) and negative (family confrontation, stress, longer work hours, social 
isolation, diminished teamwork, endangered career prospects) attributes of remote 
working (Eurofound-ILO, 2017).  
Felstead and Henseke (2017), for instance, show that remote working is associated 
with higher organisational commitment, job satisfaction and job-related well-being, 
but these benefits also come at the cost of work intensification and a greater inability 
to switch off. They find that the detachment of work from workplaces is a growing 
trend that cannot only be explained by compositional factors and organisational 
responses. Song and Gao (2018) show that WfH is generally associated with a lower 
level of net affect and unpleasant feelings, compared to those working in a 
workplace. However, this may vary depending on the type of remote work, with 
teleworking specifically increasing individuals’ stress. 
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In an experimental study controlling for learning and selection effects, Bloom et al. 
(2015) identified significant performance-enhancing effects of WfH. Little evidence 
was found of shirking by stay-home workers, instead they were observed to work 
more, have fewer breaks and sick days and work better (due to a quieter and more 
convenient work environment). They also reported improved job satisfaction, 
although one side effect was that promotion opportunities conditional on 
performance worsened.  
Monteiro et al. (2019) argue however that whether remote work increases firm 
productivity is theoretically ambiguous. They show using a rich and representative 
sample of Portuguese firms over the period 2011-2016 that remote work had a 
negative average productivity effect within firms. Such negative outcomes are 
accentuated for smaller-sized and non-innovative firms, as well as those that employ 
a higher share of a low-skilled workforce. 
Following the Covid-19 outbreak, a series of papers have recently tackled the issue of 
how many jobs can be feasibly done at home. Based on relevant job descriptors from 
the O*NET surveys, such as if an occupation requires performing physical activities, 
Dingel and Neiman (2020) apply a classification method to determine the plausibility 
that some occupations can be performed remotely. They find that about 34% of US 
jobs, accounting for 44% of overall wages, can plausibly be performed at home, 
although this is an upper bound estimate and the share varies considerably across 
cities and industries. They also show that while most jobs in finance, corporate 
management and professional and scientific services could plausibly be performed at 
home, this is not the case in agriculture, hotels and restaurants or retail sectors. 
Using a similar adapted methodology, Boeri, Caiumi, and Paccagnella (2020) estimate 
the home-based work potential as 24% for Italy, 28% for France, 29% for Germany, 
25% for Spain, and 31% for Sweden and the United Kingdom. Analysing a range of 
task indicators of jobs, available from the Italian occupational survey ICP-O*NET and 
the European Survey of Working Conditions, Sostero et al. (2020) also construct 
indices of the type and extent of physical teleworkability and social interaction at a 
detailed occupational level. The research highlights that about 40% of the EU 
workforce could feasibly work from home, with some variations across countries 
driven by the occupational composition of the workforce, work organisation and 
institutional arrangements. The authors note that occupations that have mostly 
benefitted from teleworking in the past are only a subset of the totality of 
occupations for which it is technically feasible to work remotely, most notably 
technicians and associated professionals and clerical work. 
A range of other country-specific studies have also revealed similar figures regarding 
the teleworkability of occupations. Martins (2020) finds that about 30% of all jobs can 
be potentially performed at home in Portugal. Dingel and Neiman (2020), Saltiel 
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(2020)34 and Gottlieb et al. (2020) all show that poor and lower-income countries 
generally have a lower share of jobs that can be performed at home, while Hatayama 
et al. (2020) find that jobs’ amenability to homeworking increases with the level of 
economic development in countries. This conclusion is echoed by ILO (2020b) 
analysis showing that close to 18% of workers work in occupations and live in 
countries with an infrastructure that allows them to effectively perform their work 
from home, although with significant differences between the regions of the world. 
Specifically, Northern American and Western European workers have the largest 
capability for carrying out remote work.  
Delaporte and Rena (2020) similarly estimate the teleworkability of jobs in 23 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries and document considerable variation, in the range 
of 6-17%, across countries but also occupations, industries, regions and workers’ 
socioeconomic characteristics. It is shown that the feasibility of homeworking is 
positively correlated with highly skilled and high-paying occupations, as well as with 
individuals’ education level, urban status and level of job formality. Women are also 
found to be more likely than men to work from home in developing countries, 
reflecting pre-established gender roles. 
Focusing on the historical incidence of WfH in Ireland, Redmond and McGuinness 
(2020) show that 14% of employees in Ireland usually or sometimes work from home, 
mostly in the education, ICT and finance sectors, while this figure falls to 6% for 
‘essential’ employees and 2% for those in the accommodation and food service 
sectors. Results from their econometric model indicate that homeworking is less 
likely among women, essential employees, non-Irish nationals and young workers, 
and far more likely in higher-paid occupations compared to elementary occupations. 
Couples with children are more likely to work from home, compared to single 
parents.  
Survey-based evidence has been collected to detect some early shifts in the 
economy, including in the share of people WfH. Brynjolfsson et al. (2020) report the 
results of a nationally-representative sample of the US population with focus on their 
adaptability to the Covid-19 pandemic. Based on Google Consumer Surveys carried 
out between 1-5 April, the authors show that 34.1% of those who were commuting 
four weeks earlier were WfH at the time of the survey. They also argue that there is 
significant scope for converting (mostly younger-aged) workers who are currently 
commuting to remote workers. 
Baert et al. (2020) conducted a state-of-the-art web survey among Flemish 
employees to examine their perceptions of telework on various life and career 
aspects during such a time of sudden, obligatory and high-intensity telework. The 
 
34  Saltiel (2020) constructs his measure of teleworkability by classifying workers as unable to work 
from home if they either do not use a computer at work, lift heavy objects, repair electronic 
equipment, operate heavy machinery or report that customer interaction is very important. 
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survey data shows that most respondents attribute positive characteristics to 
teleworking, such as increased efficiency and lower risk of burnout. However, some 
fear that it diminishes their promotion opportunities and weakens ties with 
colleagues and employer. Individuals with resident children also feel a greater strain 
due to the need to strike a balance between work and family obligations. It is noted 
that teleworking could constitute a means of overcoming ethnic labour market 
discrimination due to the lessened exposure of migrants with customers and co-
workers. 
Several papers have also focused on the impact that remote work has on economic 
outcomes. Adams Prassl et al. (2020) demonstrate that workers in alternative work 
arrangements and in occupations in which only a small share of tasks can be done 
from home are more likely to have reduced their hours, lost their jobs and suffered 
falls in earnings due to the coronavirus pandemic. Fadinger and Shymik (2020) detect 
a negative relationship between WfH and Covid-19 cases and infections in Germany, 
while they also show that under confinement the regions that experienced larger 
output loss were those where the share of homeworkers was lower. They also 
compute that a maximum of 42% of jobs in Germany could potentially be done from 
home, mainly in the finance, ICT and teaching industries. This is lower than the upper 
bound estimate of Alipur et al. (2020) also for Germany, who calculate that WfH is 
feasible for roughly 56% of the overall working population. The latter is based on 
survey data capturing workers for whom remote performance is not possible, even if 
granted the option by their employers. They show that less than half of this potential 
was exploited in the pre-pandemic German economy. 
Despite some variation in estimates of the feasibility of homeworking across different 
countries, most studies agree that teleworking potential – “teleworkability” - is 
significantly underexploited. There is also broad consensus that the crisis may 
accentuate inequities in labour markets, given that those with lower levels of 
education and wages, younger adults, ethnic minorities and migrants and informal or 
precariously employed workers are typically less concentrated in occupations 
amendable to remote work (Yasenov, 2020).  
Such relatively vulnerable population groups are also found to be overrepresented in 
jobs with higher social distancing risk, as shown by Pouliakas, and Branka (2020). 
Although the latter authors do not explicitly focus on measuring the incidence of 
remote work, their skills-based analysis identifies determinants of jobs with higher 
social distancing risk in Europe. These are defined as jobs demanding intense 
interpersonal skills (customer-service, teamworking and communication skills) and a 
low level of digital skills. Such skills attributes are also underlying traits of non-
teleworkable jobs and hence there should be an inverse correlation among the two 
phenomena, as confirmed in section 5 below. 
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3. Data and descriptive statistics 
To analyse the prevalence, evolution and determinants of homeworking in Greece, 
the Greek sample of the European Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) is drawn covering 
the period 2008-201835. The EULFS is the largest European household survey 
classifying the population of working age (aged 15 and over) in each of 31 European 
countries (EU27 plus UK, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland) according to their main 
employment status. Participating countries are responsible for collecting data on 
over 100 variables collected quarterly and annually. The EU-LFS data collection is 
carried out mainly via computerised questionnaires collected though personal visits, 
telephone and web interviews as well as self-administered questionnaires. The 
survey is of very high quality and ensures comparability across countries, given that 
it is based on probability (random) sampling and it uses the same concepts and 
variable definitions. It follows International Labour Organisation (ILO) guidelines and 
classifications (main labour force status, occupation, economic activity, education 
attainment, region etc.), it is used to derive key EU labour market statistics and 
indicators and has withheld the test of time.  
In carrying out the survey in Greece, the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT), 
following the guidance of Eurostat, samples about 27,000 households and 43,600 
persons aged 15-74 in an average quarter. The survey collects rich information about 
the demographic, geographical and educational characteristics of individuals, labour 
market status, employment characteristics of main and second jobs, characteristics 
of the unemployment experience for those actively searching for work as well as the 
job searching methods used by the inactive population. 
For the purposes of measuring the percentage of employees that worked from home 
in Greece and their job determinants, a sample of paid employed individuals aged 15-
64 has been retained36. A specific variable included in the EU-LFS, HOMEWK, is used 
to quantify the incidence of Greek employees WfH. This variable, intended to assess 
the reconciliation of work with family life as well as flexible work arrangements, 
measures whether individuals ‘usually’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘never’ do any productive 
activities as part of their current job from home in the year of the survey. ‘Usually’ is 
defined as WfH at least half of the days worked in the four weeks preceding the end 
of the reference week, while ‘sometimes’ refers to cases where individuals work at 
home less than half of the days but at least one hour in the reference period. Those 
captured under ‘never’ have on no occasion worked at home in the four weeks 
preceding the end of the reference week of the survey. 
 
Figure 2 Share of Greek employees WfH (occasionally or usually), 2008-2018 
 
35  The year 2018 is the latest year made available by Eurostat at the time of writing this article. 
36  While self-employed individuals have a higher incidence of homeworking (about 5%) relative to 
employees (about 4%), the former have been dropped from the sample because many of the 
factors examined in the empirical analysis are only valid for employees.  
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Source: Greek Labour Force Survey 
 
The variable excludes cases where the place of work is offered via a separate entrance 
to one’s home (e.g. a medical practice). It also necessitates that the specific working 
arrangement is part of a formal arrangement between the employee and his/her 
employer, either as part of the contractual agreement or involving other formal 
procedures of notice. The teleworking arrangement is also confirmed via the 
provision of a personal computer to the employee so that he/she can carry out the 
job tasks.  
Table 1 shows that over the period 2008-2018 about 3.9% of Greek adult employees 
engaged in some work from home. In 2018, the closest date before the onset of the 
Covid-19 episode, this share was 4.4%, accounting for about 110k employees. WfH 
was therefore considerably lower in Greece relative to other EU countries. While the 
percentage of home workers declined between 2008-2010, there was an upward 
trend between 2010-2016, mostly driven by occasional stay-at-home employees, 
that subsequently levelled off (Figure 2).  
Table 1 Share of Greek employees WfH (occasionally or usually), 2008-2018 
 Never Occasionally Usually WfH 
Total 96.14% 2.23% 1.63% 3.86% 
Gender     
Male 97.01% 1.81% 1.18% 2.99% 
Female 95.04% 2.77% 2.19% 4.96% 
Age group     
15-24 98.36% 0.98% 0.67% 1.64% 
25-34 97.20% 1.77% 1.03% 2.80% 
4.1%
3.8%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
3.8% 3.7%
4.4% 4.3% 4.2%
4.1%
2.7%
2.2%
1.6%
1.8%
2.3% 2.2%
1.9%
2.5%
2.4% 2.4%
2.6%
1.4%
1.5% 1.4%
1.7 1.7% 1.6%
1.8% 1.8%
1.9% 1.8%
1.5%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Remote Occasionally Usually
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35-44 96.35% 2.25% 1.40% 3.65% 
45-54 95.04% 2.69% 2.27% 4.96% 
55-64 94.65% 2.77% 2.58% 5.35% 
Highest education attainment     
Low 98.84% 0.53% 0.63% 1.16% 
Medium 98.54% 0.86% 0.60% 1.46% 
High 91.36% 5.08% 3.56% 8.64% 
Household status     
One adult without children 95.37% 2.69% 1.94% 4.63% 
One adult with children less 
than 15 94.84% 2.48% 2.67% 5.16% 
One adult with children 15-24 93.78% 3.60% 2.62% 6.22% 
Couple without children 95.52% 2.87% 1.62% 4.48% 
Couple with children less than 
15 95.71% 2.55% 1.74% 4.29% 
Couple with children 15-24 95.26% 2.69% 2.05% 4.74% 
Two adults (not couple) without 
children 97.01% 1.55% 1.45% 2.99% 
Two adults (not couple) with 
children less than 15 98.04% 1.15% 0.81% 1.96% 
Two adults (not couple) with 
children 15-24 97.35% 1.48% 1.17% 2.65% 
Continuing learning activities     
Yes 92.50% 3.55% 3.94% 7.50% 
No 96.30% 2.18% 1.53% 3.70% 
Multiple jobs     
Yes 92.95% 4.19% 2.86% 7.05% 
No 96.20% 2.20% 1.61% 3.80% 
Size of local unit     
1-10 97.29% 1.53% 1.19% 2.71% 
11-19  94.47% 3.26% 2.28% 5.53% 
20-49  93.47% 3.43% 3.10% 6.53% 
50+ 96.04% 2.26% 1.69% 3.96% 
Occupation     
Managers 92.86% 3.97% 3.17% 7.14% 
Professionals 86.08% 8.17% 5.75% 13.93% 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 97.62% 1.58% 0.81% 2.38% 
Clerical support  98.78% 0.78% 0.44% 1.22% 
Services and sales 98.59% 0.78% 0.63% 1.41% 
Skilled agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 99.26% 0.55% 0.19% 0.74% 
Craft and related trades 99.18% 0.48% 0.33% 0.82% 
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Plant and machine operators 
and assemblers 98.98% 0.64% 0.38% 1.02% 
Elementary occupations 98.49% 0.36% 1.15% 1.51% 
Region     
East Macedonia, Thrace 96.20% 2.42% 1.37% 3.80% 
Central Macedonia 95.21% 2.60% 2.19% 4.79% 
West Macedonia 96.32% 2.58% 1.10% 3.68% 
Thessaly 98.25% 1.00% 0.74% 1.75% 
Epirus 95.97% 3.02% 1.00% 4.03% 
Ionian islands 97.75% 1.49% 0.76% 2.25% 
Western Greece 95.64% 2.99% 1.37% 4.36% 
Peloponnese 96.47% 1.76% 1.77% 3.53% 
North Aegean 96.98% 2.00% 1.02% 3.02% 
South Aegean 96.25% 2.50% 1.25% 3.75% 
Mainland Greece 96.88% 1.85% 1.27% 3.12% 
Attica 95.78% 2.23% 1.99% 4.22% 
Crete 96.93% 1.78% 1.29% 3.07% 
Source: Greek Labour Force Survey. 
 
Table 137 also reveals that the incidence of WfH is larger for females, older-aged 
workers and those with higher levels of education. It is prevalent among natives and 
single parent households with children. People who work at home are more likely to 
have been employed before joining their current employer, have a permanent or full-
time contract or longer tenure and engage in multiple jobs. They are significantly 
more likely to undertake supervisory duties as part of their job in mostly medium-
sized firms, work fewer average hours, engage in more continuing learning and are 
more highly paid than non-homeworkers. 
In terms of sectoral distribution, it is notable that the share of Greek workers doing 
some work from their own premises is largely driven by those employed in the 
education sector (18%). However, it is also high in the ICT sector (6%) and in 
professional services (6%) and other service activities (5%). The highest percentages 
of employees WfH are also evident for professionals (14%; specifically, teaching 
professionals and legal, social and cultural professionals), managers (7%; notably, 
administrative and commercial managers), ICT technicians and sales workers. Finally, 
the incidence of remote work is highest for workers residing in Central Macedonia, 
Western Greece and Attika and lowest for those living in Thessaly and the Ionian 
islands. 
 
4. Estimation methodology 
 
37  Also see Annex 1 and 5 for full sample descriptive statistics and breakdowns. 
 82 
4.1 Determinants of remote work 
To investigate the determinants of homeworking in Greece, the following probit 
multivariate regression equation is estimated on a dependent binary variable, H, that 
aggregates all Greek employees who have worked at least one hour from home in 
the reference period, namely those who usually or sometimes worked from home38:  
𝐻𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑗𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑓 + 𝑢𝑖  [1] 
where di captures a set of demographic factors (gender, age group, nationality, 
highest education attainment, marital status, number of children below 15 years old) 
of individual i,  ji is a set of job-related characteristics (years of tenure, part time job, 
temporary contract, supervisory responsibilities, firm size, usual work hours, working 
atypical hours (such as shifts, nights, evenings or weekends), economic sector and 
occupational group) and ri captures the household region. Time dummies, Tf, are also 
included in the specification to capture any individual-invariant factors (e.g. 
macroeconomic conditions) that varied during the period under investigation and ui 
is the error term. Hubert-White robust standard errors are estimated throughout. 
 
4.2 Job tasks and skill needs of remote work 
A second step in the analysis aims to explore the profile of the tasks and skills needed 
by the jobs of Greek homeworkers, relative to those who work from a more typical 
office setting. For this purpose, the Greek LFS data are merged at the level of a “job”39 
with the Eurofound European jobs monitor (EJM) task database as well as Cedefop’s 
European skills and jobs survey (ESJS).   
As explained in Eurofound (2016), a data set containing descriptions of the task 
intensity of jobs i.e. all two-digit occupation-by-sector combinations in Europe, has 
been constructed from various international sources, including Eurofound’s 
European working conditions survey (ESWC), OECD’s Survey of adult skills (PIAAC), 
the American O*NET database and the EU labour force survey (LFS)40. This is based 
on a task framework that classifies and measures tasks along two main dimensions, 
the content of the tasks themselves and the methods and tools used to perform them 
(Fernandez-Macias and Bisello, 2016; 2020). The content part of the task framework 
 
38  Table 2 also provides the empirical output of separate probit regressions for those who work 
occasionally and usually from home. 
39  Following Eurofound (2016), a ‘job’ is defined as the combination of an individual’s industry 
(40 NACE Rev.2 activities) and detailed occupation group (2-digit ISCO08). The task dataset contains 
information on a total of 1520 sector-occupation combinations. After harmonising the dataset with 
the list of 19 broader groups of economic activities available in the LFS dataset, the merging of the 
two datasets is made for 741 ‘jobs’. 
40  The dataset is available from Eurofound (2016) What do Europeans do at work: a task-based 
analysis https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2016/labour-market/what-do-
europeans-do-at-work-a-task-based-analysis-european-jobs-monitor-2016  
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identifies three main classifications of task content: physical, intellectual and social, 
each with various sub-indicators. The methods and tools of work capture the extent 
to which workers use machine or ICT tools. For this paper, the 2015 task indices 
extracted for Greece are used.  
Similarly, the analysis merges the Greek LFS data with unique information on the skill 
needs of jobs in Greece as collected by the European skills and jobs survey (ESJS)41, 
an EU-wide survey developed and financed by the European Centre for the 
Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop). The first ESJS, carried out in 2014, 
collected data on skill requirements and skill mismatch from a representative sample 
of about 49 000 adult workers (aged 24 to 65) from the (then) 28 Member States of 
the EU. For Greece, specifically, it surveyed about 2 000 adult employees. 
In addition to standard demographic and job characteristics, the survey collected 
extensive information on the skill requirements of EU jobs. Respondents were asked 
to assess ‘On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means not at all important, 5 means 
moderately important and 10 means essential, how important are the following skills 
for doing your job?’, where the skills set included literacy, numeracy, information and 
communication technology (ICT) skills, communication skills, teamworking skills, 
customer handling skills, foreign language skills, problem-solving skills, 
planning/organisation skills and technical/job-specific skills. 
Once the data are merged, the probit estimation in equation (1) is replicated with the 
inclusion of the tasks (t) or skill needs (s) variables in the specification:  
𝐻𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑡, 𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑗𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  [2] 
To provide a benchmark to the Greek estimates, equations (1) and (2) are also 
estimated on the full sample of adult employees in other EU Member States available 
in the EULFS dataset. 
 
4.3 Assessing the feasibility of homework in Greece 
As discussed in section 2, a key question of policy importance following the Covid-19 
crisis has been how many jobs can be “potentially” performed at home in terms of 
physical and technical feasibility i.e. their “teleworkability”. For instance, using a 
classification scheme that distinguishes occupations according to whether they 
involve “working outdoors” or “operating vehicles, mechanised devices, or 
equipment”, Dingel and Neiman (2020) estimate that slightly above one third of jobs 
in Greece can be potentially done remotely, while Hatayama et al. (2020), who 
 
41 For full details of the European skills and jobs survey see: 
https://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/events-and-projects/projects/european-skills-and-jo bs-esj-
survey; and Cedefop (2015) and Cedefop (2018). The full dataset is available for download at: 
https://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/events-and-projects/projects/european-skills-and-jobs-esj-
survey/access-to-data 
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construct a WfH amenability index for 53 countries, demonstrate that Greece is 
bundled with the group of labour markets that have very low amenability to remote 
work.  
This study therefore also aims to measure the extent of deviation between the 
current incidence of homework in Greece and its potential feasibility threshold. In 
the absence of a specific Greek occupational survey with detailed information on job 
tasks, the methodology superimposes on the Greek LFS data (at 3-digit occupational 
level) the external classifications of the “teleworkability” of occupations as derived 
by Sostero et. al (2020). These authors build their classification based on analysis of 
a detailed set of job tasks of workers, as collected in a sample survey of occupations 
in Italy42 and the ESWC43. It focuses on those tasks that are predictive of the extent 
to which different work activities can be carried out from a remote site.  
Specifically, the classification of 5-digit occupations according to their physical 
teleworking feasibility is based on a series of relevant indicators that distinguish work 
that cannot be done remotely, including their manual or finger dexterity, performing 
of general physical activity, handling and moving objects, inspecting equipment, 
structures or materials, operating vehicles, devices or equipment. A 5-digit 
occupation is classified as not physically teleworkable if any of these activities is 
sufficiently important (namely, it has a score of over 40% on the importance scale). 
Using an official mapping, the 5-digit occupational classification is subsequently 
aggregated to the 3-digit ISCO08 taxonomy. This classification is further refined based 
on ESWC data that identifies jobs involving lifting or moving people.  
The authors also construct a supplementary index of social interaction task content, 
using relevant indicators such as if a job involves selling or influencing others, training 
or teaching, assisting or caring, performing or working directly for the public and tasks 
involving the coordination of others. Any occupation that is totally or partially 
teleworkable from a technical perspective can be additionally assessed in terms of 
how efficient the provision of labour services will be if they were to be performed 
remotely, as a function of the degree of social interaction involved (see Sostero et al. 
2020 for the full classification table and methodological details).  
 
42  The Italian ICP (Indagine Campionaria delle Professioni), conducted in 2007 and 2012 by the 
National Institute for Public Policy Analysis (INAPP) in collaboration with the Italian National 
Statistical Institute (ISTAT), is structured according to the information content of the US 
Occupational Information Network (O*NET) survey. It describes how about 16,000 employed 
people carry out the 800 professional units that make up the elementary structure of the Italian 
Classification of Occupations (CP2011). 
43  The European survey of working conditions is a survey carried out by the European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) in 35 countries (including 
Greece) interviewing nearly 44,000 workers. It provides detailed information on a broad range of 
issues, including exposure to physical and psychosocial risks, work organisation, work–life 
balance, and health and well-being. The analysis described in the text uses data from the 6th 
ESWC carried out in 2015. 
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This classification of occupations is subsequently matched to the jobs of Greek 
workers at the 3-digit occupational level using the LFS dataset. It is acknowledged 
that the structure of the Greek labour market and the nature of jobs tasks of Greek 
employees may differ relative to Italian and other European counterparts, so further 
tests of the plausibility of this matching process have been undertaken. Specifically, 
the externally-derived classification of the teleworkability of occupations has been 
firstly validated using specific information on the job tasks of Greek employees and 
after replicating the methodology of Hatayama et al. (2020) on the Greek PIAAC 
sample44.  
Secondly, the extent to which the average characteristics of Greek homeworkers 
differ relative to those of other European counterparts has been examined. To do so, 
a standard decomposition analysis as outlined by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) 
has been carried out using the EULFS data (see Annex 2 for a description of the 
approach). This deconstructs the gap in the incidence of remote working between 
Greek workers and others into a part that is attributable to differences in their mean 
productive characteristics (the explained part) and a part that is due to different 
returns to such characteristics (the unexplained part). In this manner it becomes 
possible to detect the extent to which observable characteristics contribute to 
differences in remote working between Greek and non-Greek workers and how much 
of the wedge can be attributed to other unobserved influences. 
 
4.4 Estimating the wage return to remote work 
A final step of the study is to estimate the implications that WfH has on workers’ 
wages. Using information on the deciles of monthly take-home pay45 available in the 
Greek LFS data, a Mincer-type earnings regression is performed, as follows: 
𝑊𝑖 = 𝜗0 + 𝜃1𝑊𝑓𝐻𝑖 + 𝜃2𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝜃3𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑖 + 𝜗4𝑡𝑒𝑛
2
𝑖 + 𝜃5𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑖 + 𝜃6𝐸𝑑𝑖 +
𝜃7𝐿𝑖 + 𝜃8𝑇𝑓 + 𝜀𝑖 [3] 
where the monthly net earnings, W, of individual i is regressed on the WfH indicator 
variable and on variables capturing gender, age band, years of tenure and its 
quadratic term (to capture the concavity of job-specific acquired human capital), as 
well as the highest level of education attainment level (Ed) and an indicator variable 
 
44  Due to limited sample sizes in the Greek PIAAC data at the 3-digit occupational level, and 
since the job task information available in PIAAC is more limited relative to the O*NET approaches, it 
has been preferred to utilise the teleworkability classification of Sostero et al. (2020) for the main 
analysis of the paper. The Greek-specific PIAAC analysis is used for robustness purposes. 
45  This includes the last monthly pay after deduction of income tax and National Insurance 
Contributions. It includes regular overtime, extra compensation for shift work, seniority bonuses, 
regular travel allowances and per diem allowances, tips and commission, compensation for meals. 
It excludes income from investments – assets, savings, stocks and shares.  
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capturing a person’s investment in continuing learning activities (L). Time dummies, 
Tf, are also included to control for time-varying effects that are fixed across 
individuals and 𝜖 is the error term. 
Given that the wage information in the LFS dataset is only available in the form of ten 
deciles, equation (3) is estimated using an ordered probit estimator and 
corresponding marginal effects are reported for each interval of the wage distribution 
(see Annex 5). Standard Mincer wage equations are also estimated on continuous 
(monthly/hourly) wage variables. The latter is derived by keeping the median values 
of each of the monthly income bands included as options in the Greek LFS survey. 
Information on employees’ usual weekly hours in their main job is also used to derive 
a measure of (log) net hourly wages. 
 
5. Empirical findings 
5.1 Determinants of homeworking in Greece 
Table 2 displays the association between a number of demographic, socioeconomic 
and job characteristics of adult employees in Greece and their incidence of WfH.  In 
the decade preceding the 2020 coronavirus crisis, which is expected to have caused 
a structural change in the share and composition of remote working in most 
countries, it is interesting to observe that homeworking in Greece was characterised 
by several idiosyncratic features relative to other countries.  
WfH, especially on a usual basis, is found to be more prevalent among females and 
non-nationals. Younger Greek workers up to middle age are less likely to engage in 
remote work, despite being more digitally literate compared to older cohorts (OECD, 
2016). WfH is more widespread among tertiary educated individuals, while it is 
striking that there is little difference in the estimated probability of homeworking 
among those qualified at below upper secondary and medium-education level. 
Having a first child or more than 3 young children in the household is also positively 
associated with a propensity to regularly work at home.  
Other things equal, adult employees who work from home are more likely to have 
been in inactivity before starting their current job, which hints to the fact that such 
workers, who may have already become accustomed to carrying out activities at 
home, are more inclined to retain this working mode in their new employment. By 
contrast, individuals making a school to work transition have lower chances of 
agreeing with their employer to work from their own premises. As mostly occasional 
homeworkers have greater chances of engaging in moonlighting, this alludes to the 
fact that the ability to work from home can be combined with engagement in 
additional work activities for some people (e.g. freelancing or working in the online 
platform economy).  
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Table 2 Determinants of WFH, Probit estimates, Greece, 2008-2018 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 WfH WfH 
occasionally 
WfH usually WfH males WfH 
females 
      
Male -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.12*** … … 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)   
Non-native 0.20*** -0.04 0.30*** 0.02 0.23*** 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.019) (0.026) (0.021) 
Married -0.01 0.05*** -0.06*** 0.00 0.02 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) 
Age: 25-34 -0.02 -0.06** 0.03 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.033) (0.034) (0.031) 
Age: 35-44 0.07*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.02 0.09*** 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.034) (0.035) (0.032) 
Age: 45-54 0.17*** 0.02 0.30*** 0.07* 0.22*** 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.034) (0.036) (0.033) 
Age: 55-64 0.23*** 0.05 0.35*** 0.12*** 0.29*** 
(ref: 15-24) (0.026) (0.032) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) 
Education: 
Medium 
-0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.05** -
0.06*** 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) 
Education: High 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 
(ref: Low) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) 
Child15: 1 0.03*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.01 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) 
Child15: 2 0.01 -0.03* 0.05*** 0.09*** -
0.05*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) 
Child15: 3 0.05** -0.01 0.11*** 0.19*** -0.07** 
(ref: 0) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Moonlight 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.29*** 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029) (0.038) 
Continuous 
learning 
0.22*** 0.07*** 0.32*** 0.19*** 0.24*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) 
Last stat: 
unemployed 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.032) (0.036) (0.030) 
Last stat: student -0.09** -0.23*** 0.09 -0.24*** -0.01 
 (0.045) (0.057) (0.059) (0.084) (0.056) 
Last stat: inactive 0.13** 0.01 0.23*** 0.10 0.12 
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(ref: employed) (0.055) (0.074) (0.067) (0.073) (0.084) 
Years of tenure -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -
0.00*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Part-time 0.05*** -0.16*** 0.25*** 0.06** 0.04 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.024) 
Temporary -0.04*** -0.04** -0.02 -0.06*** -0.01 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) 
Supervisor 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) 
Firm size: 11-49 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.12*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
Firm size: 20-49 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.27*** 0.12*** 0.24*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) 
Firm size: 50+ 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.10*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Firm size: DK<11 0.00 0.06*** -0.08*** 0.01 0.01 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) 
Firm size: DK>10 -0.02 0.01 -0.04** -0.07*** 0.02 
(ref: 1-10) (0.013) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) 
Weekly hours 0.01*** -0.00*** 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Atypical hours 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.20*** 0.29*** 0.37*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Urban: 
Towns/suburbs 
0.02* 0.07*** -0.05*** 0.02 0.02 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Urban: Rural area 0.03*** 0.07*** -0.03** 0.06*** 0.02* 
(ref: Cities) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Industry dummies x x x x x 
Occupation 
dummies 
x x x x x 
Region dummies x x x x x 
Time dummies x x x x x 
Constant -2.33*** -1.79*** -3.35*** -2.06*** -
2.67*** 
 (0.063) (0.076) (0.093) (0.084) (0.124) 
Observations 565,898 565,898 565,898 312,094 253,804 
NB: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Greek Labour Force Survey. 
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In addition to doing more than one jobs, the empirical estimates also draw attention 
to the potential disruption in work-life balance that WfH may entail for some 
individuals. Ceteris paribus, homeworkers in Greece are found to work longer and 
atypical work hours. Households comprised of couples with children (especially those 
with separated parents) have a lower estimated probability of WfH, compared to 
childless households. This is concerning as it may pose a strain on parents trying to 
combine work with child-care responsibilities46. 
Working remotely is found to be more prominent for individuals in part-time jobs and 
with a permanent contract, after controlling for work hours and other individual and 
job characteristics, as well as for those with supervisory responsibilities in their main 
job. Part-timers are more inclined to work on a frequent basis from home, while 
temporary workers are particularly less likely to do occasional remote work. Workers 
in micro-sized firms are the least likely to have the ability to do remote work, in 
contrast to those in medium-sized establishments.   
A finding of interest is the positive partial correlation between (mostly usual) remote 
work and workers’ further participation in formal or non-formal education and 
training activities. During the coronavirus confinement period, specific policy 
measures and programmes, in Greece and other European countries, have been 
implemented to promote the use of distance- and other forms of remote learning. 
The positive partial relationship between remote work and continuing education and 
training implies that there may be a reinforcing link between homeworking and 
continuing learning.  
Examining this association in more depth reveals that it is underpinned by persons 
being in regular education (especially by people undertaking advanced research 
studies i.e. ISCED 7-8) but more so by those following non-formal taught learning 
activities (courses, seminars, conferences, private lessons). It is observed that remote 
workers are more likely to engage in non-formal education and training that is job-
related and takes place mostly or solely outside working hours. It is also confirmed 
that the relation is not distorted by the inclusion of employees aged below 24 years, 
or those still in regular education as main status and that it holds when dropping from 
the sample all individuals whose main subjective labour market status is not 
employment47.  
With respect to the sectoral and occupational distribution of homeworking, the 
empirical estimates confirm that employees in the education, ICT and professional 
services have higher probability of doing remote work. Similarly, professional 
occupations have the highest probability of WfH, whereas technicians and associate 
professionals and clerks, whose jobs in general share similar characteristics in terms 
 
46  The results on household status are not reported in Table 2, as they are correlated with the 
number of children, but are available from the author upon request. 
47     All results are available from the author upon request. 
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of social interaction and use of digital technologies with professionals, have 
significantly lower chances for WfH (Redmond and McGuinness, 2020). 
Finally, the estimates reveal a statistically significant geographical variation in terms 
of the incidence of remote work in Greece, with workers in Attika and South Aegean 
engaging more in home-based work, in contrast to similar employees in West 
Macedonia, Thessaly and North Aegean. Working in non-urban areas is also positively 
associated with the offer to work from home, especially on an occasional basis. 
  
5.2 Gender differences in homeworking  
Given the importance of WfH for reconciliation of work-life balance and as a means 
of flexibility in work arrangements, Table 2 further examines any gender differences 
in its determinants in the Greek labour market. Some important differences include 
the fact that female homeworkers are more likely to be non-nationals, in contrast to 
males. With respect to age, men engage in remote forms of work only when they are 
of considerably older age, whereas women do so from their 30s (possibly reflecting 
strong gender roles in relation to the assumption of child care responsibilities). 
Medium-qualified female employees in Greece are particularly less inclined to work 
from home than the lower educated, as opposed to equivalently qualified men. It is 
also striking that females with younger children have a lower probability of WfH, 
compared to those with no offspring. Thus, the estimated positive total mean effect 
of child-bearing on homeworking is driven entirely by Greek men, especially those 
with more than 3 children. 
Further interesting gender differences include the fact that female homeworkers in 
Greece are more likely to moonlight, signifying that they may be encountering hours 
or income constraints in their main job (Pouliakas, 2017) and use the opportunity of 
WfH to engage in other work activities. Women who work remotely also work longer 
and atypical work hours. However, they are more inclined to engage in further 
education and training than males, which may reflect that they try to utilise the added 
flexibility of WfH to further promote their skills and career opportunities. Male 
employees have greater chances of doing remote work than women in part-time and 
permanent jobs, larger-sized firms and in rural areas.   
   
5.3  “Essential” workers and WfH 
Redmond and McGuinness (2020) examine the specific relationship between WfH 
and jobs in which “essential” services were provided during the coronavirus 
lockdown. Such jobs include workers in the health care and public administration 
sectors (armed forces, police officers etc.) but also food and transportation services 
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and some retail workers, necessary for meeting basic population needs. They show 
that just 6% of essential employees WfH in Ireland, compared to an average of 16% 
for non-essential employees. 
Using the Greek LFS data, a dummy variable has been created identifying the share 
of Greek workers employed in such ‘essential’ job posts. The characterisation of 
essential services utilised by Redmond and McGuinness (2020), who combine specific 
industry and occupational codes, is mimicked. However, a more detailed and 
augmented approach is employed that identifies essential occupations based on 3-
digit occupational codes, combined with the industrial taxonomy in some cases to 
narrow down the selection of workers (see Annex 3). About 33.5% of Greek 
employees are found to belong to this group of essential occupations.48  
Table 3: WfH and essential jobs, Probit estimates, Greece, 2011-2018 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 WfH WfH 
occasionally 
WfH 
usually 
WfH 
males 
WfH 
females 
      
Essential -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.22*** -0.19*** -0.26*** 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) 
Full set of 
control 
variables 
x x x x x 
Constant -2.46*** -2.13*** -3.23*** -2.35*** -2.79*** 
 (0.081) (0.097) (0.118) (0.106) (0.156) 
Observations 362,401 362,401 362,401 196,433 165,968 
NB: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Probit 
estimates; all regressions include a full set of control variables as in Table 2. 
Source: Greek Labour Force Survey. 
 
As noted by Redmond and McGuinness (2020) for Ireland, there is a higher 
concentration of females and part-time workers among essential occupations. Such 
jobs are also, on average, lower-paid and with a higher share of low-educated 
workers. However, in Greece, in contrast to Ireland, essential workers are more likely 
to be non-natives, middle-aged and live in households with children. They work more 
 
48  The share of essential jobs falls to 24% if the occupations related to sales categories are 
excluded from the indicator variable, as it is not entirely clear which sales jobs are essential given 
that some retail outlets were forcefully shut during the pandemic lockdown and others not. The 
analysis using this indicator variable can only be performed for the period 2011-2018 due to the 
ISCO classification revision in 2011.  
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and atypical hours per week and participate less in continuing education and training 
activities. 
Despite such differences in characteristics, just 1.5-2% of essential employees are 
found to WfH in 2018 compared to 5-6% of non-essential workers. Estimation of 
equation (1) with the inclusion of an ‘essential services’ dummy variable in the 
specification further confirms that the prevalence of WfH is statistically significantly 
lower for workers at the frontline of service delivery and care during a pandemic (see 
Table 3). Other things equal, essential workers have a 1% lower marginal probability 
of WfH. This negative relationship is pronounced for female essential employees, 
who have a 2% lower predicted probability of WfH relative to males. 
 
5.4 Trend of WfH in Greece 
As revealed in Figure 2, the incidence of WfH has stayed relatively constant at around 
4% over the past decade, with a significant fall in occasional remote work between 
2008-2010 that was subsequently reversed. Table 4 first reveals the impact of various 
unobserved time-varying factors (time dummies) on the incidence of home working, 
when the dependent variable is regressed only on them. The estimated intercepts 
reveal a statistically significant negative trend between 2008-2014 that was 
subsequently reversed but flattened until 2018.  However, when taking into account 
the changing composition of the working population and jobs in the Greek labour 
market during these years, which was marked given the significant impact of 
economic restructuring policies (Christopoulou and Monastiriotis, 2018), it becomes 
evident that homeworking has been in steady decline during the previous decade and 
it has not managed to bounce back to its 2008 level. 
Table 4 Evolution of WfH in Greece, 2008-2018 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 time dummies 
only 
& industrial 
composition 
& industrial & 
demographic 
composition 
full 
specification 
     
2009 -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
2010 -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.19*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
2011 -0.08*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
2012 -0.01 -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
2013 -0.03** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
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2014 -0.05*** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
2015 0.03** -0.02 -0.03** -0.06*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
2016 0.02 -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.10*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
2017 0.01 -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.10*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
2018 -0.00 -0.06*** -0.09*** -0.12*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
(ref: 2008)     
Industry controls  x x x 
Occupation 
controls 
 x x x 
Worker controls   x x 
Job controls    x 
Constant -1.74*** -1.70*** -1.98*** -2.33*** 
 (0.009) (0.046) (0.052) (0.063) 
Observations 582,591 568,947 568,947 565,898 
NB: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Probit 
regressions; Col. 1 only controls for time dummies; Col. 2 controls for 
industry/occupation dummies; Col. 3 also controls for gender, age, education and 
native status; Col. 4 controls for full set of set of controls as in Table 2. 
Source: Greek Labour Force Survey. 
 
While the incidence of WfH is anticipated to have risen in Greece following the 
coronavirus lock down period, it is hence clear that Greek businesses and workers 
were insufficiently gearing up to face the public health shock and ensuing spike in 
demand for remote working arrangements in preceding years.    
 
5.5 Tasks and skills of remote jobs  
While the above-mentioned findings paint a wide-ranging portrait of the type of jobs 
and workers engaged in remote working in Greece, it does not fully reveal the nature 
of tasks and skills demanded by homeworking jobs. Knowing the structure of the 
tasks and skill needs of jobs can yield additional insight for policymakers who wish to 
understand what exactly workers do as part of their jobs, in contrast to the broad 
characterisations provided by their sector of economic activity and occupation49.  
 
49 As noted by Fernandez-Macias and Bisello (2020), the amount of individual variance in task content 
that can be explained by the occupation/sector combination ranges between 30% and 40%. Hatayama 
et al. (2020) further estimate that occupations capture only half or less of the types of tasks that 
workers do on-the-job. Occupation-industry dummies are hence an imperfect proxy of what 
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To detect the nature of the tasks and skills demanded by Greek homeworkers, the 
Greek LFS data have been merged at the level of ‘jobs’ to the Greek samples of the 
Eurofound European Job Monitor (EJM) task dataset and Cedefop’s 1st European skills 
and jobs survey (ESJS). This has been done for the 2015 and 2014 LFS waves, 
respectively, as described in section 4.  
Table 5 Job tasks, skill needs and WfH, Probit estimates, Greece and other 
Europe 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Job tasks EL 
 (EJM) 
Skill needs EL 
(ESJS) 
Job tasks 
other Europe 
(EJM) 
 
CONTENT OF WORK 
   
Physical tasks    
Strength -2.57***  0.65*** 
 (0.633)  (0.061) 
Dexterity -0.32  -2.02*** 
 (0.451)  (0.061) 
Intellectual tasks    
Literacy: Business -0.41  -0.25*** 
 (0.355)  (0.041) 
Literacy: Technical -1.37***  -0.06 
 (0.320)  (0.037) 
Literacy: Humanities 1.49***  0.69*** 
 (0.337)  (0.038) 
Numeracy: Accounting  -0.08  0.18*** 
 (0.216)  (0.025) 
Numeracy: Analytic 0.14  0.01 
 (0.336)  (0.030) 
Problem-solving: information 
retrieval 
-0.39  0.01 
 (0.405)  (0.049) 
Problem-solving: creativity 1.13***  0.65*** 
 (0.373)  (0.057) 
Social tasks    
Serving/attending 1.27***  -0.97*** 
 (0.391)  (0.044) 
Selling/influencing -0.13  -0.13*** 
 
individuals do in their work, as noted by the now significant literature on the ‘task approach to labour 
economics’ (Russo, 2017; Bisello and Fernandez-Macias, 2016, 2020; Eurofound, 2016; Handel, 2016; 
Pouliakas and Russo, 2015; Autor and Handel, 2013; Autor, 2013). 
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 (0.333)  (0.045) 
Teaching/training/coaching 2.16***  0.94*** 
 (0.371)  (0.043) 
Managing/coordinating -2.23***  -1.12*** 
 (0.513)  (0.053) 
METHODS & TOOLS OF WORK    
Methods    
Autonomy -0.33  -0.11** 
 (0.366)  (0.047) 
Teamwork -0.37***  -0.10*** 
 (0.138)  (0.013) 
Routine: repetitiveness 0.12  -0.06*** 
 (0.181)  (0.019) 
Routine: standardisation 0.48***  0.05*** 
 (0.169)  (0.016) 
Tools    
Using machinery -0.11  -0.53*** 
 (0.407)  (0.047) 
Basic ICT -0.28  0.36*** 
 (0.234)  (0.030) 
Advanced ICT 0.30  0.10*** 
 0.11  (0.034) 
SKILL NEEDS    
Basic literacy  -0.11  
  (0.074)  
Advanced literacy  -0.19**  
(ref: No literacy skills needed)  (0.084)  
Basic numeracy  -0.09  
  (0.089)  
Advanced numeracy  -0.22**  
(ref: no numeracy skills needed)  (0.092)  
Moderate ICT  0.29***  
  (0.060)  
Advanced ICT  0.05  
(ref: Elementary ICT skills needed)  (0.070)  
Job-specific   0.01  
  (0.009)  
Communication   0.056**  
  (0.012)  
Teamworking   -0.10***  
  (0.009)  
Foreign language  -0.03***  
  (0.009)  
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Customer service  0.00  
  (0.008)  
Problem-solving  -0.02  
  (0.014)  
Learning  0.090***  
  (0.012)  
Planning  0.01  
  (0.011)  
COVID-19 SOCIAL DISTANCING 
RISK 
 -0.33***  
(high social & low digital skill 
needs) 
 (0.060)  
Constant -2.94*** -2.46*** -0.90*** 
 (0.585) (0.350) (0.083) 
Observations 40,279 36,544 737,566 
NB: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Probit 
regression includes full set of controls as in Table 2. Col. 1&3 matches the respective 
samples of the European Jobs Monitor task dataset with the Greek LFS (2015) and EU 
LFS data at the “jobs (sector-2-digit occupation)” level. Col. 2 matches the Greek 
sample of the European skills and jobs survey data with the Greek LFS (2014) data at 
“jobs (sector-2-digit occupation)” level. The Covid-19 social distancing risk index is 
derived as in Pouliakas and Branka (2020). 
Source: Greek Labour Force Survey; European Jobs Monitor task dataset; European 
skills and jobs survey. 
 
Table 5 displays the estimated coefficients of the specific tasks and skill needs 
variables obtained from the estimation of equation (2) on the respective samples. 
The estimates reveal interesting insights about the nature of the work done and skills 
required by Greek employees who WfH. Specifically, they are found to be less likely 
to engage in physical activities requiring strength, highlighting that most manual work 
cannot be moved to remote work spaces. Those carrying out relatively basic 
information processing tasks of a codifiable nature, such as technical-related 
intellectual tasks (writing letters, memos, invoices, manuals, instructions, reports 
etc.), are also found to have lower chances of WfH.  
What is clear is that working away from office premises tends to be more prevalent 
among Greek workers who engage in social serving tasks (responding directly to 
demands from the public or customers) and teaching tasks (imparting knowledge or 
instructing others). The same holds for employees carrying out more advanced 
intellectual tasks (reading or writing articles or books, creativity and planning). By 
contrast, the need to coordinate or supervise the behaviour of colleagues or 
sell/influence others constitute an impediment to homeworking. 
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An interesting observation is that the jobs of Greek homeworkers tend to be 
characterised by work methods that involve a marked degree of standardisation. This 
implies that mostly jobs in which work procedures and outputs are predefined and 
encoded in a formalised system lend themselves to remote work. 
Similar conclusions are drawn when examining the importance of different skills 
needed by the jobs of Greek homeworkers. The analysis reveals that distance work is 
relatively less likely to require advanced literacy and numerical skills. By contrast, the 
nature of the work carried out by Greek stay-home employees is mostly characterised 
by a higher importance of communication skills (which includes teaching and 
instruction) and basic digital skills. Such findings concur with the description of the 
task content of their jobs, as described before, specifically the high reliance on 
routine standardised tasks.  
Because of the greater need to engage in social interaction and physical proximity 
with people, there is also a negative correlation between the importance of 
teamworking and foreign language skills with homeworking. Moreover, the evidence 
further supports the positive association between remote working and continuous 
learning for one’s job, such as learning and applying new methods and techniques, 
adapting to new technology or equipment or materials and engaging in own learning. 
 
5.6 Remote work as safeguard to social distancing? 
With the onset of the Covid-19 confinement and associated social distancing 
measures, a large part of the labour force was either made redundant, put on 
furlough or some form of short-time working arrangement or forced to work 
remotely from home. Greece, a country that acted relatively swiftly in the 
implementation of preventive measures to counteract the exponential spread of the 
virus, experienced a spike in joblessness at first instance, which was slowed down by 
the implementation of government policies to encourage employee retention (e.g. 
short-time work arrangements) by firms (SEV, 2020b). The pressure for ensuring work 
continuity from a distance was therefore accentuated during the lock-down. As the 
country moves steadily towards the gradual lifting of strict confinement measures 
and towards a new norm of social distancing in workplaces, it is interesting to 
examine if the jobs of workers most exposed to social distancing risk are conducive 
to the take up of remote working, which would lower adjustment costs. 
To investigate this issue, the Covid-19 social distancing risk index (COV19R) has been 
derived as described in Pouliakas and Branka (2020). COV19R is a weighted index 
combining information on the importance of skills involving physical proximity or 
contact with other people (communication, team-working and customer handling 
skills) as well as jobs’ digital skill intensity. Larger values of COV19R indicate a larger 
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potential loss in employee productivity and possible job destruction due to social 
distancing measures.  
As shown in Table 5, there is a statistically significant negative correlation between 
higher COV19R values and the probability of remote working in Greece. This draws 
attention to the fact that workers who may be most affected by social distancing 
measures in the post-peak-coronavirus period are the ones least likely to be using the 
WfH option. 
 
5.7 Comparison with other European employees 
In order to explore whether the determinants of homeworking deviate between 
Greek and other EU employees, Table 6 provides as a comparison the estimated 
coefficients for a sample of other European employees (excluding Greeks). The 
results are extracted by running separate probit regressions of equation (1) for 2018, 
the last year publicly available in the EULFS.  
To compare any deviation in the patterns of WfH between Greek and other European 
homeworkers, considering that the residual variance of the two subgroups may differ 
in binary dependent variable models (Allison, 1999), a seemingly unrelated 
estimation is performed using both sample estimates. The hypothesis of equality of 
coefficients between the estimated Greek and other European WfH models is 
subsequently tested and rejected (𝜒2(44) = 3569.75 ∗∗∗).  
 
 
Table 6 Determinants of WfH, Probit estimates, other Europe, 2018 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All employees Males Females Wald test of 
coefficient 
equality  
EL-other Europe  
Male 0.01*** … … 13.59*** 
 (0.004)    
Non-native -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.12*** 30.71*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)  
Married 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 6.41** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)  
Age: 25-34 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.32*** 26.26*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.013)  
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Age: 35-44 0.46*** 0.42*** 0.51*** 38.07*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)  
Age: 45-54 0.48*** 0.43*** 0.53*** 14.11*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)  
Age: 55-64 0.44*** 0.39*** 0.49*** 13.51*** 
(ref: 15-24) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)  
Education: Medium 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.07*** 16.65*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)  
Education: High 0.38*** 0.42*** 0.36*** 49.37*** 
(ref: Low) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)  
Moonlight 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.42 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)  
Continuing learning 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 12.23*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)  
Years of tenure -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 6.47** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Part-time 0.10*** 0.21*** 0.03*** 38.11*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.009)  
Temporary -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.07*** 2.34 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)  
Supervisor 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 7.35*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)  
Firm size: 11-49 -0.26*** -0.20*** -0.30*** 96.57*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)  
Firm size: 50+ -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.23*** 56.50*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)  
Firm size: DK<11 -0.28*** -0.22*** -0.33*** 35.24*** 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.019)  
Firm size: DK>10 -0.28*** -0.22*** -0.32*** 152.16*** 
(ref: 1-10) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015)  
Usual weekly hours 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 47.47*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Atypical hours 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 7.64*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  
Urban: 
towns/suburbs 
-0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 17.47*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)  
Urban: rural areas -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 7.08*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)  
Industry dummies x x x  
Occupation 
dummies 
x x x  
Country dummies x x x  
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Constant -1.21*** -1.46*** -0.98***  
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.042)  
Observations 1,331,893 676,837 655,056  
NB: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; other European 
countries include all EU27 countries (excluding Greece) plus NO, IS, CH, UK; Col. (4) shows the 
output of Wald tests following a SURE estimation of WfH for both the Greek and other Europe 
samples. Source: EU Labour Force Survey. 
The extent of the difference in the marginal effects between the two samples is also 
assessed by comparing relatively homogenous samples of Greek and other European 
workers, in terms of the composition of their measurable characteristics. In 
particular, marginal effects of the explanatory factors have been estimated for the 
other European sample after constraining their values to the respective mean values 
of the Greek sample. Comparing the marginal effects of the two samples based on a 
fixed profile of observable characteristics does not affect the main conclusions.50 
Specifically, the comparison highlights that, in contrast to the Greek job market51, 
there are higher chances of males, natives and those in non-supervisory posts 
working remotely in other European countries. While younger Greek workers at early 
stages of their career, as well as those with medium-level qualifications and children, 
also have a lower likelihood of home-based work. This stands in contrast to the 
flexibility enjoyed by their European counterparts. Greek remote workers also work 
significantly more atypical hours than other Europeans. 
WfH is a flexible work arrangement used more frequently by Europeans in micro-
sized firms and mostly applies to managerial occupations, whereas in Greece it affects 
mostly professional occupational groups and those in medium-sized firms. WfH also 
applies to Greeks living in towns and rural areas, as opposed to other Europeans for 
whom remote work is predominantly a phenomenon in densely populated areas.  
 
5.8 How many jobs can be done remotely in Greece? 
As discussed in section 4.3, a key question of policy importance following the Covid-
19 crisis is how many jobs can be potentially performed at home. Following the 
methodology described above that classifies occupations according to their 
 
50  For instance, the estimated marginal probability of WfH at the means of the sample characteristics 
for the other European sample is 0.44. It is equal to 0.5 when constrained at the average value of 
the factors of the Greek sample. 
51  These comparisons have been corroborated by estimating equation (1) on the 2018 wave of the 
Greek LFS data. The effect of the variables indicating the number of children and last employment 
status (not shown in the table) have also been estimated in a separate regression that contains a 
subset of EULFS countries, for which these optional variables were collected. 
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teleworkability, we measure the extent of deviation between the current incidence 
of homeworking in Greece and its technical feasibility threshold. 
Specifically, the teleworkability classification of 3-digit occupations as obtained from 
external sources is matched to the respective jobs of Greek workers using the LFS 
sample. As mentioned in section 4 and described in Annex 2, the differences in 
remote working between Greek and other European workers is not driven by 
discrepancies in the nature of their job tasks and other labour market endowments. 
Furthermore, the teleworkability classification derived using non-Greek sources has 
been corroborated using Greek-specific PIAAC data, after applying the methodology 
of Hatayama et al. (2020) (Fig A4.1, Annex 4). Both robustness tests provide support 
to the approach of using the teleworkability indices derived from non-Greek samples 
for the purposes of making inferences about the WfH amenability of jobs in Greece.  
This analysis hence reveals that between 35-37% of all Greek employee jobs 
(affecting about 869-922k workers) can potentially be performed away from 
traditional office premises. Specifically, about 25.4% of Greek jobs are found to be 
fully teleworkable, 12% highly teleworkable, 25% little teleworkable and 37.6% fully 
not teleworkable. This indicates that the Greek labour market has marked scope in 
terms of expanding the use of remote working, considering that only 4.4% (about 
110k) of employees worked from home in 2018.  
For instance, the data reveal that only about 8-9% of Greek employees in potentially 
teleworkable jobs were exploiting this capability in the years preceding the Covid-19 
crisis52, implying that there is considerable space to further mobilise about 800-837k 
employees towards WfH arrangements. Annex 4 highlights that the type of 
occupations with greatest loss in terms of their teleworkability potential include 
general office clerks, teaching- and finance-related professions and other secretarial 
posts.  
 
5.9 Wage effects of remote work 
A final step in the analysis of this paper includes investigation of whether workers 
who perform their tasks at home receive a wage premium or penalty, compared to 
other equivalent employees who work at employers’ premises53.  
 
Table 7 Wages and WfH, ordered probit estimates, Greece, 2009-2018 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
52  Similarly, for about 2.5% of the jobs classified as non-teleworkable, individuals are found to 
actually WfH. 
53  As the income variable is not available for 2008 in the LFS dataset, the analysis in this section 
is performed on the 2009-2018 period. 
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 Mincer full spec WfH 
frequenc
y 
detailed 
occupati
on 
job 
tasks 
WfH 0.19*** 0.10***  0.17*** 0.19*** 
 (0.009) (0.009)  (0.011) (0.029) 
WfH 
occasionally 
  0.21***   
   (0.011)   
WfH usually   0.16***   
   (0.014)   
Mincer worker 
controls 
x x x x x 
Job controls  x    
Job tasks      x 
Industry 
controls 
 x    
Occupation 
controls  
     
-1-digit-  x    
-3-digit-    x  
Region controls  x    
Time dummies x x x x  
Observations 429,656 417,043 429,656 309,776 37,527 
NB: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Col. 1-3 
includes data for 2009-2018; Col. 4 for 2011-2018; Col. 5 includes data only for 2015. 
Col. 1 controls for gender, age bands, tenure, tenure squared, highest education, 
continuous learning and time dummies. Col. 2 includes full set of controls as in Table 
2. Col. 4 includes 3-digit occupations. Col. 5 includes job tasks after merging the LFS 
data with the European Jobs Monitor task dataset at “jobs (sector-occupation)” level. 
Source: Greek Labour Force Survey. 
 
Column 1 in Table 7 shows the estimated coefficient on WfH when only the basic set 
of controls corresponding to a Mincer earnings specification is included. Column 2 
also includes controls for job characteristics, industry and occupational dummies, as 
well as regional fixed effects. Column 3 also reports the coefficients when the WfH 
indicator is broken down into its frequency. Finally, given that the feasibility of WfH 
depends on the nature of the job and the work context, the wage impact of remote 
work is also estimated albeit with the inclusion of detailed 3-digit occupational codes 
as well as after controlling for the nature of a job’s tasks, as described in section 5.5. 
The estimations illustrate that remote work in Greece is associated with a significant 
monthly net earnings premium and that the effect is robust to the inclusion of a 
detailed set of control variables that provide a fuller description of the nature of a 
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job’s activities54. Other things equal, it is calculated that the marginal probability of 
reporting the top income decile [Pr(income = 10)] is about 2% higher for remote 
workers in Greece. Reversely, the probability of reporting the lowest 3 deciles is 
about 1-2% lower for stay-home workers. This positive relationship between remote 
work and earnings is slightly greater for those who only occasionally perform work at 
home.  
When the Mincer earnings specification is applied to a continuous (log) net monthly 
earnings dependent variable (see Annex 5), the latter constructed by considering the 
median values of each of the take-home salary bands, it is found that Greek remote 
workers earn about 7% higher net monthly wages, compared to equivalent workers 
who work at office premises55. At an average net monthly salary of about EUR 1114, 
this implies that remote workers in Greece earn about EUR 80 more per month than 
equivalent office-based employees56. 
Investigating the reasons behind the higher wage premium of remote workers in 
Greece is outside the scope of this paper and constitutes an interesting avenue for 
future research. However, considering the relatively standardised and interactive 
task content of the jobs of remote Greek employees, as described in section 5.5. 
above, a possible explanation for the higher wages of remote workers over their 
counterparts in traditional workplaces may be unobserved productivity differences, 
as opposed to job competition. These may include, inter alia, a premium attached to 
the higher aptitude of individuals working from a distance and their ability to deploy 
ICT-based technologies for their work, when necessary.  
6. Conclusions 
 
54  The estimated coefficients on the remaining variables reveal statistically significant effects as 
anticipated from the literature, namely a concave age and tenure effect, highest returns to more 
education and a gender wage gap. Given the stark economic crisis that affected the country, the time 
dummies indicate a consistently declining trend of monthly earnings that was accentuated between 
2012-14. Moreover, the analysis reveals a statistically negative relationship between wages and 
physical tasks and autonomous and routine tasks, while intellectual and team-working tasks are 
associated with wage premiums. A greater intensity of working with machinery and ICT tools is also 
associated with higher wages. See Annex 5 for more details. 
55  This wage premium is reduced to 6% when 3-digit occupational codes are included in the 
regression and to 3% when a full set of job, socioeconomic and regional factors are considered. 
Occasional (regular) remote workers earn about 8% (5%) more monthly earnings compared to those 
who do not WfH. 
56  Running a Mincer earnings regression using (log) net hourly pay as dependent variable, 
derived by dividing individuals’ monthly net earnings with their usual weekly work hours, reveals that 
Greek remote workers earn about 17% higher net hourly wages than equivalent office-based 
employees. This higher estimate reflects the lower mean hours of WfH employees. Such findings are 
in accordance with similar analyses in the literature, such as Irlacher and Koch (2020), who report an 
hourly wage premium to WfH of about 12% for German workers after accounting for narrowly 
defined jobs and detailed work activities 
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The onset of the Covid-19 crisis has been accompanied by significant changes and 
challenges to labour markets, most notably an increasing reliance on online forms of 
working, taking place from a distance. While WfH was a rather limited form of work 
arrangement in the pre-Covid-19 era, recent estimates highlight that over a third of 
all jobs in advanced economies could be amenable to remote working. Such figures 
are likely to be an upper bound, as they capture the technical feasibility of remote 
work, while many organisations and individuals may decide to strike some balance 
between home- and office-working, or not use the WfH option even if available. 
Stories of several organisations shutting down their office spaces for the sake of 
remote work arrangements abound and several authors have argued that remote 
work is here to stay, due to advancements in technology and social developments, 
efficiency of online/social media communities and the low benefits of knowledge 
spillovers among knowledge workers who work in close proximity to others (Clancy, 
2020).  
On the other hand, others note that there have been several efforts to ‘telecommute’ 
work in the past, starting from the 1970s, that did not materialise into widespread 
adoption (Cappelli, 2020). As also supported by the evidence in this paper, most 
remote work is feasible for self-contained tasks, while due to difficulties in 
performance management it is dependent on high trust relations between managers 
and workers. Despite social distancing practices, concerns also exist about the 
negative impact remote work may have on teamworking and workplace innovation. 
Essential services and much low-wage work is also not amenable to remote work. 
Greece, a country that was still bearing the brunt of its previous economic and debt 
crisis, entered into these challenging times with an ailing public health system, 
systemic and high unemployment and a labour market that was still mostly analogue 
as opposed to digital. While the country used the opportunity of the crisis to 
forcefully expand the adoption of digital technologies across many parts of its 
economy and society, it will require huge investment and commitment by 
government, organisations and individuals so that it is no longer a digitalisation 
laggard. The analysis in this paper has showed that up to 35-37% of all jobs in the 
Greek job market have high teleworkability potential. 
Greek businesses, in particular smaller-sized ones, will have to embrace the WfH 
option as a viable and flexible option for its workforce, should they wish to remain 
competitive and to facilitate social distancing norms. And yet it is for such firms that 
the benefits of remote work may not materialise. In order to manifest into higher 
productivity gains, WfH requires significant investment into a higher-skilled 
workforce and substantial efforts to stimulate an innovation culture that supersedes 
the confines of physical workspaces. 
Moreover, the paper draws attention to the fact that a supportive policy and 
regulatory environment is needed to facilitate the take-up of WfH in Greece. Such 
policy actions must provide stronger child care facilities and financial support to 
 105 
households with children, especially females employees with young children, and to 
those providing essential services in times of a pandemic. Striking a better work-life 
balance, especially for females, is also necessary to avoid stress-related negative 
outcomes of working atypical hours from home. Moreover, reversing the limited 
take-up of remote work by younger individuals and those in early career stages will 
require elevated trust in industrial relations in the Greek job market.  
At a time where continued adherence to social distancing practices may be required 
over the medium-term period, extending the option to WfH for employees most 
likely to be affected by the consequences of Covid-19 will be key for mitigating the 
continued adverse consequences of the pandemic for Greece.  
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Annex 1.  
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A1.1 Sample summary statistics 
     
 Mean s.d. Min Max 
WfH 0.039 0.193 0 1 
WfH never 0.961 0.193 0 1 
WfH occasionally 0.022 0.148 0 1 
WfH usually 0.016 0.127 0 1 
Male 0.559 0.496 0 1 
Non-native 0.104 0.305 0 1 
Married 0.629 0.483 0 1 
Age group     
15-24 0.057 0.232 0 1 
25-34 0.251 0.434 0 1 
35-44 0.314 0.464 0 1 
45-54 0.272 0.445 0 1 
55-64 0.106 0.308 0 1 
Highest education attainment     
Low 0.240 0.427 0 1 
Medium 0.415 0.493 0 1 
High 0.345 0.475 0 1 
Child < 15     
0 0.644 0.479 0 1 
1 0.190 0.392 0 1 
2 0.140 0.347 0 1 
3 0.026 0.160 0 1 
Years of tenure 
10.59
0 9.225 0 48 
Usual weekly hours 
39.03
1 9.236 0.5 80 
Atypical hours (Cronbach alpha; z-scored) 0.000 1.000 
-
0.89075 
1.98994
3 
Part time 0.079 0.270 0 1 
Temporary 0.122 0.327 0 1 
Supervisory duties 0.114 0.317 0 1 
Multiple jobs 0.018 0.132 0 1 
Continuing learning activities 0.042 0.200 0 1 
Labour market status before job     
Employed 0.943 0.232 0 1 
Unemployed 0.042 0.201 0 1 
Student 0.009 0.097 0 1 
Inactive 0.006 0.075 0 1 
Size of local unit     
1-10 0.354 0.478 0 1 
 110 
10-19 0.149 0.356 0 1 
20-49 0.118 0.322 0 1 
50+ 0.182 0.386 0 1 
DK: <11 0.074 0.262 0 1 
DK: >10 0.123 0.329 0 1 
Economic activity of local unit     
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 0.025 0.155 0 1 
Manufacturing (including mining) 0.125 0.330 0 1 
Electricity, gas & steam 0.012 0.107 0 1 
Water supply & sewerage 0.011 0.105 0 1 
Construction 0.061 0.240 0 1 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Transportation & storage 0.049 0.215 0 1 
Accommodation & food storage 0.078 0.268 0 1 
ICT 0.023 0.149 0 1 
Financial & insurance & real estate 0.031 0.174 0 1 
Professional scientific & technical 0.031 0.173 0 1 
Administrative & support service 0.023 0.151 0 1 
Public administration & defence 0.140 0.347 0 1 
Education 0.115 0.319 0 1 
Human health & social work. 0.075 0.263 0 1 
Arts, entertainment 0.013 0.115 0 1 
Other service activities 0.037 0.189 0 1 
Occupation      
Managers 0.016 0.126 0 1 
Professionals 0.194 0.395 0 1 
Technicians and associate professionals 0.103 0.304 0 1 
Clerical Support Workers 0.152 0.359 0 1 
Service and sales Workers 0.208 0.406 0 1 
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishing 
workers 0.009 0.096 0 1 
Craft and related trades 0.119 0.324 0 1 
Plant and machine operators and Assemblers 0.083 0.276 0 1 
Elementary 0.116 0.320 0 1 
Region      
East Macedonia, Thrace 0.063 0.242 0 1 
Central Macedonia 0.154 0.361 0 1 
West Macedonia 0.028 0.164 0 1 
Thessaly 0.052 0.223 0 1 
Epirus 0.057 0.231 0 1 
Ionian islands 0.021 0.145 0 1 
Western Greece 0.053 0.224 0 1 
Peloponnese 0.057 0.232 0 1 
North Aegean 0.022 0.146 0 1 
South Aegean 0.028 0.164 0 1 
Mainland Greece 0.056 0.231 0 1 
Attica 0.332 0.471 0 1 
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Crete 0.078 0.268 0 1 
Degree of urbanisation     
Towns/suburbs 0.247 0.431 0 1 
rural 0.316 0.465 0 1 
cities 0.437 
.496039
6 0 1 
Income     
Monthly take-home income deciles 5.271 2.604 1 10 
Monthly take-home salary  
1114.
6 581.1 200 2500 
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Decomposition analysis 
 
As is customary, the total difference in the incidence of remote work between the two groups is 
decomposed in the conventional Oaxaca manner, following estimation of equation (2) separately 
for the Greek and other European worker samples, as follows: 
𝐻𝐺 −𝐻𝐸 = (?̅?𝐺 − ?̅?𝐸)?̂?𝐺 + (?̂?𝐺 − ?̂?𝐸)?̅?𝐸   [4] 
where the first part of the equation (‘explained’ or ‘endowment’ part) reflects the component of 
the average difference in remote work between the two groups attributed to differences in the 
means of the explanatory variables (namely, X = t, d, j, r, T), which are in turn weighed by the 
estimated coefficients ?̂? following estimation of equation (2) for the Greek sample only. It 
measures the relative importance of observable differences in job tasks and other individual and 
job characteristics between the two sets of workers.  
The second term (i.e. the ‘unexplained’ part) refers to the part of the gap in remote working that 
arises because of the differential manner with which different employee characteristics contribute 
to the probability of WfH. In this respect, it provides an indication of the extent to which the Greek 
and other European labour markets impose constraints on the ability of workers to engage in 
remote work given their observable characteristics. The latter may arise either because of 
discriminatory practices in the job market, or differences in work organisation and other 
institutional factors. Of particular interest for the purposes of this study is the extent to which the 
Greek and non-Greek samples deviate in terms of their measured task content of their jobs.  
What Table A2 reveals is that the observed difference in the incidence of remote work between 
Greeks and other European workers can be attributed predominantly to their difference in the 
way their observed characteristics facilitate a higher probability of WfH. By contrast, it is found 
that the difference in endowments between the two groups accounts for a relatively small 
proportion of their difference in shares engaging in remote work. Significant deviations in 
endowments between Greeks and other European workers are only observed in the variables 
part-time, atypical hours and accommodation and food service (industry), which are characterised 
by a higher incidence in the Greek sample, while in other European labour markets remote 
workers are more likely to have supervisory responsibilities, be employed in micro-sized firms (1-
10 employees) and belong to non-professional occupational groups.  
 
Table A2.1: Decomposition analysis of WfH differences between Greek and other European 
employees, 2018 
Raw differential (R) {E+C+U}: -59.5 
Amount attributable: -84.7 
- due to endowments (E): -3.0 
- due to coefficients (C): -81.7 
Shift coefficient (U): 25.2 
Adjusted differential (D) {C+U}: -56.5 
  
Endowments as % total (E/R): 5.1 
Unexplained as % total (D/R): 94.9 
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NB: Based on Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the WfH incidence between Greeks and other 
European workers; separate probit regressions are first run for each group with WfH as 
dependent variable on the full set of controls as in Table 2. Dummies variables have been 
transformed to reflect deviations from the ‘grand mean’.  
Source: EULFS 
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Classification of “essential” occupations 
To classify the jobs of Greek employees according to whether they involve the provision of 
‘essential’ services during a pandemic, the following detailed occupational and industrial 
codes have been used: 
Table A3.1: Classification scheme for identifying essential jobs 
ISCO08 
3-digit 
code 
Occupational group NACE 
Rev.2 2-
digit code 
Economic activity 
221 Medical doctors Q Human health & 
social work 
222 Nursing and Midwifery 
Professionals 
Q Human health & 
social work 
315 Ship and Aircraft Controllers and 
Technicians 
Q  
321 Medical and Pharmaceutical 
Technicians 
Q Human health & 
social work 
322 Nursing and Midwifery Associate 
Professionals 
Q Human health & 
social work 
522 Shop salespersons G Wholesale & retail 
trade 
523 Cashiers and Ticket Clerks G Wholesale & retail 
trade 
524 Other Sales Workers G Wholesale & retail 
trade 
532 Personal Care Workers in Health 
Services 
  
541 Protective Services Workers O, N, Q Public 
administration & 
defence; 
Administrative & 
support services; 
Human health & 
social work 
611 Market Gardeners and Crop 
Growers 
  
612 Animal Producers   
613 Mixed Crop and Animal Producers   
622 Fishery Workers, Hunters and 
Trappers 
  
751 Food Processing and Related 
Trades Workers 
  
816 Food and Related Products 
Machine Operators 
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831 Locomotive Engine Drivers and 
Related Workers 
  
832 Car, Van and Motorcycle Drivers   
833 Heavy Truck and Bus Drivers   
911 Domestic, Hotel and Office 
Cleaners and Helpers 
  
921 Agricultural, Forestry and Fishing 
Labourers 
  
933 Transport and Storage Labourers   
941 Food Preparation Assistants   
961 Refuse Workers   
0 Armed Forces   
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Teleworkable occupations in Greece and “lost potential” 
Table A4.1 Distribution of Greek employees across occupations with full or 
high “WfH technical feasibility” and low incidence of “actual WfH” 
Occupation Freq Percent 
General Office Clerks 170.5378 20.37 
Primary School and Early Childhood 
Teachers(h) 65.83671 7.86 
Secondary Education Teachers 57.47853 6.87 
Finance Professionals 51.47156 6.15 
Client Information Workers 51.33367 6.13 
Financial and Mathematical Associate 
Professionals 40.99653 4.9 
Secretaries (general) 37.92226 4.53 
Administrative and Specialized Secretaries 34.4462 4.11 
Other Teaching Professionals(h) 31.87285 3.81 
Tellers, Money Collectors and Related 
Clerks(h) 31.50897 3.76 
Social and Religious Professionals(h) 26.59 3.18 
Numerical Clerks 26.56789 3.17 
Other Clerical Support Workers(h) 22.22941 2.66 
Software and Applications Developers and 
analysts 19.9796 2.39 
ICT Operations and User Support 
Technicians(h) 19.16059 2.29 
Administration Professionals(h) 16.13869 1.93 
Sales, Marketing and Public Relations 
Professionals 13.11113 1.57 
Government regulatory associate 
professionals(h) 12.24364 1.46 
Other Health Professionals(h) 11.61799 1.39 
Legal Professionals 10.66305 1.27 
Sales and Purchasing Agents and Brokers 10.14796 1.21 
Professional Services Managers 8.62549 1.03 
University and Higher Education Teachers(h) 8.19005 0.98 
Authors, Journalists and Linguists 7.633077 0.91 
Vocational Education Teachers 6.9227 0.83 
Travel Attendants, Conductors and Guides(h) 6.81191 0.81 
Business Services and Administration 
Managers 6.258123 0.75 
Keyboard Operators 5.586323 0.67 
Sales, Marketing and Development 
Managers 5.20207 0.62 
Legal, Social and Religious Associate 
Professionals 3.737652 0.45 
Hotel and Restaurant Managers(h) 2.966725 0.35 
Mathematicians, Actuaries and Statisticians 2.492598 0.3 
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Other Services Managers(h) 2.02696 0.24 
Managing Directors and Chief Executives 1.809725 0.22 
Business Services Agents 1.822695 0.22 
Life Science Technicians and Related 
Associate Professionals(h) 1.7101 0.2 
Librarians, Archivists and Curators 1.265247 0.15 
Legislators and Senior Officials 0.9715 0.12 
Database and Network Professionals 0.876185 0.1 
ICT Professionals 0.495845 0.06 
Total 837.26 100 
NB: Table includes, in order of prevalence, the list of 3-digit occupational groups 
identified as “teleworkable” but with a high share of workers who do not WfH. 
(h) indicates occupations with high teleworkability, the remaining are fully 
teleworkable. 
Source: Greek Labour Force Survey; Sostero et al. (2020) 
Figure A4.1 Teleworkability of occupations, Greece 
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NB: Based on a WfH amenability index as derived by Hatayama et al. (2020), namely 
combination of groups of job tasks (physical and manual, face to face, low ICT use at work, 
low ICT at home) within detailed occupational groups. Higher values indicate a greater 
amenability of jobs to WfH. Caution is needed as some mean WfH index values are based on 
very small samples. 
Source: Author’s own analysis using Greek sample of PIAAC data (2014/15), N = 1467 
employees aged 16-65. 
 
-2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
ICT professionals
Information and communications technicians
Business and administration professionals
Science and engineering professionals
Business and administration associate professionals
General and keyboard clerks
Administrative and commercial managers
Production and specialised services managers
Hospitality, retail and other services managers
Legal, social and cultural professionals
Customer services clerks
Chief executives, senior officials and legislators
Numerical and material recording clerks
Teaching professionals
Science and engineering associate professionals
Other clerical support workers
Legal, social, cultural and related associate professionals
Handicraft and printing workers
Protective services workers
Personal care workers
Health associate professionals
Refuse workers and other elementary work
Health professionals
Street and related sales and service workers
Stationary plant and machine operators
Electrical and electronic trades workers
Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers
Cleaners and helpers
Sales workers
Drivers and mobile plant operators
Personal service workers
Market-oriented skilled forestry, fishery
Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing
Metal, machinery and related trades work
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Additional empirical output 
 
Table A5.1 Share of Greek employees WfH (occasionally or usually), 2008-2018 
 Never Occasionally Usually WfH N 
Total 96.14% 2.23% 1.63% 3.86% 582,592 
Native status      
Non-native 96.62% 1.90% 1.48% 3.38% 216,327 
Native 95.85% 2.43% 1.72% 4.15% 366,265 
Marital status      
Married 96.62% 1.90% 1.48% 3.38% 216,327 
Non-married 95.85% 2.43% 1.72% 4.15% 366,265 
Children<15      
0 96.23% 2.15% 1.61% 3.77% 374,977 
1 95.96% 2.38% 1.66% 4.04% 110,669 
2 96.11% 2.31% 1.59% 3.89% 81,649 
3 95.31% 2.76% 1.94% 4.69% 15,297 
Labour market status before 
job      
Employed 96.03% 2.30% 1.67% 3.97% 549,348 
Unemployed 98.08% 1.14% 0.78% 1.92% 24,484 
Student 97.53% 1.16% 1.31% 2.47% 5,500 
Inactive 97.42% 1.14% 1.44% 2.58% 3,260 
Part-time job      
Yes 96.97% 1.63% 1.40% 3.03% 46,174 
No 96.07% 2.29% 1.65% 3.93% 536,418 
Temporary contract      
Yes 97.15% 1.53% 1.32% 2.85% 71,051 
No 96.00% 2.33% 1.67% 4.00% 511,540 
Supervisory duties      
Yes 93.20% 3.90% 2.90% 6.80% 65,930 
No 96.52% 2.02% 1.47% 3.48% 514,275 
Weekly hours      
< 25 89.77% 5.91% 4.32% 10.23% 67,832 
26-39 92.63% 4.41% 2.96% 7.37% 67,424 
>39 97.63% 1.35% 1.02% 2.37% 447,336 
Years of tenure      
< 3 97.21% 1.56% 1.22% 2.79% 172,142 
3-10 96.57% 2.02% 1.41% 3.43% 168,654 
10-17 95.73% 2.51% 1.75% 4.27% 106,899 
>17 94.55% 3.14% 2.31% 5.45% 134,897 
Economic activity of local 
unit      
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 99.39% 0.43% 0.18% 0.61% 14,349 
Mining 98.72% 0.81% 0.46% 1.28% 3,449 
Manufacturing 98.65% 0.86% 0.49% 1.35% 69,207 
Electricity, gas & steam 98.36% 1.05% 0.59% 1.64% 6,786 
Water supply & sewerage 99.00% 0.56% 0.45% 1.00% 6,479 
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Construction 99.13% 0.54% 0.34% 0.87% 35,675 
Wholesale & retail trade 98.86% 0.63% 0.51% 1.14% 88,584 
Transportation & storage 98.29% 1.07% 0.63% 1.71% 28,293 
Accommodation & food 
storage 98.84% 0.69% 0.46% 1.16% 45,511 
ICT 94.14% 3.86% 2.01% 5.86% 13,164 
Financial & insurance 97.51% 1.77% 0.71% 2.49% 17,939 
Real estate 97.72% 2.28% 0.00% 2.28% 307 
Professional scientific & 
technical 93.71% 4.49% 1.80% 6.29% 18,032 
Administrative & support 
service 98.11% 1.46% 0.43% 1.89% 13,661 
Public administration & 
defence 97.61% 1.36% 1.04% 2.39% 81,304 
Education 81.75% 10.41% 7.84% 18.25% 66,838 
Human health & social work 97.98% 1.46% 0.57% 2.02% 43,535 
Arts and entertainment 97.78% 1.34% 0.88% 2.22% 7,758 
Other service activities 97.47% 1.45% 1.08% 2.53% 9,514 
Activities as households 92.72% 0.56% 6.72% 7.28% 11,880 
Degree of urbanisation      
Cities 95.67% 2.35% 1.98% 4.33% 254,703 
Towns/suburbs 96.05% 2.42% 1.53% 3.95% 143,775 
Rural 96.86% 1.93% 1.21% 3.14% 184,114 
Income decile      
1 97.73% 1.07% 1.20% 2.27% 32,946 
2 98.09% 0.93% 0.98% 1.91% 45,912 
3 97.99% 1.06% 0.95% 2.01% 51,117 
4 98.02% 1.01% 0.97% 1.98% 46,272 
5 97.47% 1.55% 0.99% 2.53% 47,746 
6 96.53% 2.03% 1.44% 3.47% 51,421 
7 95.10% 2.97% 1.93% 4.90% 58,390 
8 93.56% 4.00% 2.44% 6.44% 44,548 
9 92.94% 4.01% 3.05% 7.06% 23,889 
10 90.83% 4.67% 4.49% 9.17% 27,416 
Source: Greek Labour Force Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5.2.  Wages and WfH, ordered probit regression, marginal effects 
Income 
deciles dy/dx Std. Err z P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
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1 
-
0.022036 
0.001026 -21.47 0.00 -0.024048 
-
0.020024 
2 
-
0.016478 
0.000769 -21.42 0.00 -0.017986 -0.01497 
3 -0.01156 0.00054 -21.41 0.00 -0.012618 
-
0.010502 
4 -0.00554 0.000259 -21.37 0.00 -0.006048 
-
0.005032 
5 
-
0.001059 
5.44E-05 -19.47 0.00 -0.001165 
-
0.000952 
6 0.004075 0.000193 21.16 0.00 0.0036977 0.004453 
7 0.011215 0.000524 21.42 0.00 0.0101887 0.012242 
8 0.013491 0.000629 21.46 0.00 0.0122591 0.014723 
9 0.009507 0.000444 21.43 0.00 0.0086376 0.010377 
10 0.018384 0.000858 21.43 0.00 0.0167025 0.020065 
NB: Marginal predictions of ordered probit regression outcomes based on 
delta-method. 
Source: Greek Labour Force Survey 
 
 
 
Table A5.3 Wages and WFH, OLS estimates, Greece, 2009-2018 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mincer 
spec 
Full spec WfH 
occasionally 
WfH 
usually 
3-digit 
ISCO 
Job 
tasks 
       
WfH 0.07*** 0.03*** … … 0.06*** 0.07*** 
 (0.004) (0.003)   (0.004) (0.013) 
WfH occasionally   0.08***    
   (0.005)    
WfH usually    0.05***   
    (0.006)   
Male 0.24*** 0.12*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
Age: 25-34 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.018) 
Age: 35-44 0.29*** 0.14*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.018) 
Age: 45-54 0.30*** 0.18*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.018) 
Age: 55-64 0.28*** 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 
(ref: 15-24) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.020) 
Education: Medium 0.17*** 0.06*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.13*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
Education: High 0.46*** 0.16*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.21*** 0.30*** 
(ref: Low) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) 
Continuing learning -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01** -0.01** -0.05*** -0.09*** 
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activities 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.016) 
Years of tenure 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Years of tenure squared -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Non-native  -0.09***     
  (0.003)     
Married  0.05***     
  (0.002)     
Child15: 1  0.02***     
  (0.002)     
Child15: 2  0.04***     
  (0.002)     
Child15: 3  0.05***     
(ref: 0)  (0.004)     
Multiple jobs  0.02***     
  (0.006)     
Last status: unemployed  -0.11***     
  (0.004)     
Last status: student  -0.19***     
  (0.009)     
Last status: inactive  -0.10***     
(ref: employed)  (0.010)     
Part-time job  -0.75***     
  (0.004)     
Temporary  -0.07***     
  (0.003)     
Supervisor  0.16***     
  (0.002)     
Firm size: 11-19  0.07***     
  (0.002)     
Firm size: 20-49  0.11***     
  (0.002)     
Firm size: >50  0.17***     
  (0.002)     
Firm size: DK<11  0.02***     
  (0.003)     
Firm size: DK>10  0.09***     
(ref: 1-9)  (0.002)     
Usual weekly hours  0.01***     
  (0.000)     
Atypical hours  0.02***     
  (0.001)     
Urban: towns  -0.02***     
  (0.002)     
Urban: rural  -0.01***     
 127 
  (0.002)     
Physical tasks      -0.23*** 
      (0.056) 
Intellectual tasks      0.89*** 
      (0.081) 
Social tasks      -0.03 
      (0.057) 
Methods: autonomy      -0.72*** 
      (0.042) 
Methods: teamwork      0.21*** 
      (0.019) 
Methods: routine      -0.18*** 
      (0.030) 
Tools: machines      0.58*** 
      (0.042) 
Tools: ICT      0.69*** 
      (0.039) 
2010 -0.01*** -0.00** -0.01*** -0.02*** …  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)   
2011 -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.06*** …  
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)   
2012 -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.12***  
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
2013 -0.30*** -0.26*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.24***  
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
2014 -0.30*** -0.24*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.23***  
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
2015 -0.09*** -0.03*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.02*** x 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
2016 -0.12*** -0.06*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.05***  
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
2017 -0.13*** -0.07*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.06***  
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
2018 -0.13*** -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.06***  
(ref: 2009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
Industry controls  x     
Occupation controls        
- 1-digit -   x     
- 3-digit -      x  
Regional controls  x     
Constant 6.03*** 6.20*** 6.03*** 6.03*** 6.51*** 5.74*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.041) 
Observations 429,656 417,043 429,656 429,656 309,776 37,527 
R-squared 0.35 0.62 0.35 0.35 0.44 0.40 
NB: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; The dependent variable is a 
continuous measure of log monthly take-home pay derived by using the median values of the income deciles 
available in the survey.  
Source: Greek Labour Force Survey 
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